From the intergroup to the interpersonal: dehumanization within close and intimate relationships by Pizzirani, Bengianni
From the Intergroup to the Interpersonal: 
Dehumanization Within Close and Intimate Relationships. 
by 
Bengianni Pizzirani 
BPsych (Hons) 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
Deakin University 
April 2018 


 iii 
Abstract 
Despite the recent emergence of research into interpersonal dehumanization (i.e., the denial 
of humanness), there has been little by way of empirical investigation of the phenomenon 
within the context of close relationships. To address this, the current dissertation aimed to 
investigate the manifestation and associated outcomes of dehumanization that occurs in 
intimate relationships. The dissertation comprises of three papers. Paper 1 describes a 
theoretical model in which dehumanization is defined as the underlying cause of hurt 
feelings. This paper provides the first detailed account of how dehumanization may manifest in 
close and intimate relationships; highlighting how the phenomenon may be associated with a wide 
range of relationship experiences and processes. Paper 2 reports on the development and 
psychometric evaluation of a dehumanization measure across three studies. In addition, Paper 
2 identifies a novel factor structure that challenges existing conceptualizations of 
dehumanization. Paper 2 also provides the first empirical evidence linking dehumanization to 
the negative relationship behaviors theorized in Paper 1, including intimate partner abuse. 
Building on the findings between dehumanization and abuse reported in Paper 2, the final 
paper reports on a longitudinal investigation regarding changes in dehumanization 
perpetration predicting changes in emotional and physical abuse over time. Importantly, 
Paper 3 provides the first empirical evidence that dehumanization may be an impelling factor 
in the maltreatment and abuse of others. Together, these papers make a significant and novel 
contribution to the study of dehumanization and close personal relationships. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
This dissertation explores dehumanization and its effects within the context of close and 
intimate relationships. Put simply, dehumanization refers to the perception or treatment of 
another person as lacking human qualities (Bain, Vaes & Leyens, 2014; Haslam, 2006, 2014, 
2015; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). While dehumanization has generally been understood to 
be an extreme phenomenon, observed in conditions of moral atrocity and intense conflict 
(e.g., the Jewish Holocaust or the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria), recent developments in 
the field have recognized that dehumanization can take the form of more commonplace 
behaviors (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2010, 2011; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2001). 
Nevertheless, no research has investigated dehumanization within the context of intimate or 
close relationships (such as people’s romantic relationships). Thus, our understanding to date 
regarding dehumanization is largely confined to the intergroup literature and social 
psychology more generally. 
The overarching aim of this dissertation is to investigate dehumanization within the 
context of close and intimate relationships. In particular, this body of work endeavored to 
advance the current understanding of dehumanization by applying this largely intergroup 
theory to the interpersonal context—specifically the realm of romantic relationships. This 
includes how dehumanization may manifest within interpersonal contexts, its association 
with other negative relationship processes (e.g., partner maltreatment and emotional and 
physical abuse) and outcomes (e.g., relationship quality) and how these associations may 
vary across both target and perpetrator perspectives of dehumanization. Specifically, this 
dissertation includes three papers that deal with the theoretical and conceptual advancement 
of dehumanization within intimate relationships (Papers 1 and 2), measurement development 
and validation of dehumanization within this context (Paper 2), and applied research 
investigating the longitudinal association between dehumanization and intimate partner abuse 
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(Paper 3). These three papers—and the structure of this dissertation more generally—are 
briefly outlined in the subsequent paragraphs.  
The first paper presented in this dissertation (Chapter 2) describes a theoretical model 
in which dehumanization is defined as the underlying cause of hurt feelings that stem from 
largely negative interpersonal interactions or experiences. Specifically, Paper 1 proposes that 
an interpersonal model of dehumanization provides a unifying framework that integrates all 
past explanations of hurt feelings (e.g., Feeney, 2004; Leary, Springer, Negel, Ansell & 
Evans, 1998; Vangelisti, Young, Carpenter-Theune, & Alexander, 2005) and reconciles many 
of the differences across previous theories, models, and typologies of hurt. Not only does 
Paper 1 propose a completely novel perspective regarding the key underlying cause of hurt, 
but it is also the first theoretical attempt to integrate dehumanization—a largely studied inter-
group phenomenon—explicitly within the study of close and intimate relationships. 
 Building on this application of dehumanization to the study of hurt feelings within 
interpersonal contexts, the second manuscript presented as part of this dissertation (Chapter 
3) describes the development and validation of a dehumanization measure within romantic 
relationships across three studies. A major barrier in linking dehumanization to close or 
intimate relationships is that no psychometrically validated measure exists to assess 
dehumanization in such contexts. Therefore, Chapter 3 details the development of a new self-
report measure that captures the full range and diversity of dehumanization that occurs within 
intimate relationships. In addition, Chapter 3 also provides a systematic conceptual and 
empirical examination of the dimensional structure of interpersonal dehumanization. In doing 
so, Paper 2 provides the field of close relationships with a psychometrically sound measure of 
dehumanization as well as a fine-grained conceptualization of the nature of interpersonal 
dehumanization. Furthermore, the Paper 2 provides some of the first empirical evidence 
linking dehumanization to intimate relationship processes and outcomes. Specifically, the 
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dimensions constituting the newly developed dehumanization measure were found to be 
positively associated with destructive communication patterns, negative partner behaviors 
such as hostility, insensitivity, interference (including care that was intrusive), as well as 
physical and emotional partner abuse. 
Based on these findings from Paper 2—in which dehumanization was found to be 
associated with a wide range of aversive relationship behaviors, including intimate partner 
abuse—the final manuscript presented in this dissertation (Paper 3, Chapter 4) considers how 
changes in dehumanization perpetration predict changes in the perpetration of emotional and 
physical abuse. That is, the initial findings from Paper 2 demonstrated that dehumanization is 
indeed associated with relationship behaviors that constitute intimate partner maltreatment 
and support the long-held view that dehumanization may function as a predictor of violent, 
aggressive and abusive acts. Specifically, in Paper 3 Latent Growth Curve Modelling 
(LGCM) was used to model whether the trajectory of dehumanization across a six-week 
period predicted changes in the perpetration of abuse measured at baseline and two-months 
post. It was found that a cubic non-linear change in dehumanization perpetration (defined by 
a combination of decreases and acute upsurges) was positively associated with increases in 
both emotional and physical abuse. In addition, the findings from Paper 3 also speak to the 
labile nature of dehumanization affirming the theoretical assumption that the phenomenon 
may be best characterized as malleable over time. 
Finally, Chapter 5 entails a general discussion of the papers constituting this 
dissertation. Specifically, the findings from the papers reported in the preceding chapters are 
summarized to draw broad and novel interpretations about the study of dehumanization 
within the context of close and intimate relationships. As part of Chapter 5, dissertation 
implications and future directions into the study of dehumanization in intimate relationships 
are also discussed.  
Chapter 2 – The Experience of Hurt 4 
CHAPTER 2: THE EXPEREINCE OF HURT; 
A DEHUMANIZATION PERPSPECTIVE 
Dehumanization has been studied in relation to a diverse range of contexts and 
phenomena. These include: prejudice, racism and power (Kahn, Goff, McMahon, 2015), 
medical settings (Haque & Waytz, 2012), organizational settings (Andrighetto, Baldissarri & 
Volpato, 2016; Christoff, 2014), emotional domains (Buckels & Trapnell, 2013), as well as 
areas such as technology (Ferrari, Paladino & Jetten, 2016), economics (Harris, Lee, 
Capestany & Cohen, 2014), and language (Fasoli et al., 2016). Despite the extensive contexts 
and phenomena in which dehumanization has been studied, there is a dearth of research 
examining the concept within the context of close or intimate relationships. Nevertheless, 
numerous negative relationship behaviors and interactions studied within the context of close 
relationships parallel many of the prototypical features of dehumanization. Thus, 
dehumanization is likely to take place within the context of intimate relationships. Moreover, 
dehumanization perpetrated by those closest to us is likely to have a particularly negative 
impact. That is, we turn to our close relationships to meet our fundamental needs of love, 
comfort and security (see Gillath, Karantzas, & Fraley, 2016), to bolster our sense of 
competence and to support our personal goals (Feeney & Collins, 2015). Therefore, when 
those closest to us engage in dehumanizing behaviors, it stands to reason that we are likely to 
experience significant negative affect (Adams, 2014), and in particular, to experience hurt.  
 In this chapter, dehumanization is presented as the underlying cause of hurt feelings 
in close relationships. That is, dehumanization is argued to be the defining feature that causes 
people to feel hurt by others. This perspective helps to reconcile the different causes of hurt 
that have been proposed to date in the literature. In doing so, the dehumanization perspective 
on hurt feelings outlined in Paper 1 (reported in this chapter) provides researchers with an 
orienting framework from which to further advance the study of hurt feelings and 
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dehumanization within close relationships. Paper 1 also provides the first theoretical 
application of dehumanization to the study of close and intimate relationships. In doing so, 
paper 1 explicitly demonstrates the utility of integrating a dehumanization perspective to the 
study of close relationships. 
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The research article that follows is the author’s copy of a manuscript submitted to Personality 
and Social Psychology Review. 
 
Pizzirani, B., & Karantzas, G. C. (2018). The Experience of Hurt; A Dehumanization 
Perspective. Under review (Revise and Resubmit). 
 
Figure 1 is included at the back the manuscript in accordance with journal submission 
requirements.  
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Abstract  
The study of hurt feelings has been approached from a variety of perspectives, all of which 
have proposed different causes for the experience of hurt. As a result, there remains 
considerable debate in the literature as to the cause of hurt. In this paper, we present a new 
perspective on hurt in which we propose that the underlying cause of hurt feelings is 
dehumanization (i.e., to be denied uniquely or fundamentally human qualities and therefore 
likened to animals or machines). As such, we demonstrate that the underlying cause of hurt 
feelings is not that a particular experience is perceived as negative, but because the 
experience is dehumanizing. Our dehumanization model of hurt presents researchers with a 
novel view of hurt feelings that re-conceptualizes and extends upon the contexts in which 
hurt is thought to occur—and in doing so—provides an integrative perspective for the study 
of hurt. 
 
Keywords: Hurt, dehumanization, interpersonal relationships, maltreatment. 
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The Experience of Hurt;  
A Dehumanization Perspective.  
Over the last two decades, there has been an increasing focus on the study of hurt feelings, 
particularly within interpersonal contexts. Despite this, the explanations for why certain 
experiences cause one to feel hurt are many and varied. For instance, some scholars have 
argued that the key feature of all hurtful experiences is a perceived devaluation of the 
relationship between the individual that has been hurt and the person who hurt their feelings 
(Leary & Springer, 2001). In contrast, other researchers have suggested that the defining 
feature of a hurtful experience is that the act violates particular relationship norms or rules 
(i.e., the experience is hurtful because it is viewed as a relationship transgression, Vangelisti, 
2001; Vangelisti & Young, 2001). More recently, researchers have proposed that for an 
experience to result in hurt feelings the experience must threaten or damage either an 
individual’s mental representations about close relationships (Feeney, 2005), future social 
connections (MacDonald, 2009), or sense of safety and security (Shaver, Mikulincer, Lavy, 
& Cassidy, 2009). 
 What is apparent across these different perspectives is that there is considerable 
debate as to the underlying cause of hurt feelings (i.e., what is the defining feature of hurtful 
experiences that cause people to feel hurt by others?). Currently, there is no broad conceptual 
framework that helps to reconcile the different causes of hurt that have been proposed. In this 
paper, we build on the perspectives briefly outlined above to suggest that there is indeed an 
underlying cause that cuts across these different perspectives and captures all forms of hurtful 
experiences within a single conceptual framework. Grounded in the literature on 
dehumanization (i.e., treating or perceiving someone as less than human, Haslam, 2006), we 
suggest that the cause of hurt feelings is that the target is dehumanized—specifically—the 
target is denied the fundamental or unique qualities that relate to being human. This includes 
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the denial of human qualities such as competency, intelligence, morality, warmth, openness 
to change, and the ability to express emotions (Haslam, 2006). In particular, this paper 
describes how dehumanization, a largely studied inter-group phenomenon, underlies hurtful 
experiences within interpersonal contexts.  
We begin the paper by defining hurt feelings and the major perspectives that have 
attempted to capture the underlying cause of hurt. We then turn our focus to the concept of 
dehumanization, with particular attention given to Haslam’s (2006) Dual Model of 
Dehumanization. In doing so, we review the relevant empirical work that has applied 
dehumanization to the examination of interpersonal relationships and highlight important 
associations between dehumanization and hurt feelings. We then present our dehumanization 
model of hurt in which we describe how the hurtful experiences previously identified by 
researchers (e.g., Feeney, 2004; Leary, Springer, Negel, Ansell & Evans, 1998; Vangelisti, 
Young, Carpenter-Theune, & Alexander, 2005) are in fact, dehumanizing. We also identify 
additional hurtful experiences1 that we suggest elicit hurt feelings but are not readily 
accounted for by previous perspectives and conceptualizations as to the underlying cause of 
hurt. Ultimately, we aim to demonstrate that the application of our dehumanization model to 
the study of hurt feelings advances upon previous conceptualizations and perspectives in 
three ways. Firstly, our model can be applied to any interpersonal context in which hurt is 
experienced, irrespective of the degree of closeness shared between the person who is hurt 
and the perpetrator of the hurtful behavior. Secondly, our proposed model is able to account 
for experiences of hurt that vary in level of severity. Therefore, our model can be applied to 
the most minor through to the most severe of hurtful experiences. Thirdly, our model 
captures the full range of interpersonal experiences that may cause someone to feel hurt (e.g., 
                                                 
1The term ‘hurtful experience(s)’ is used to describe any interpersonal event or behavior 
enacted by another that is perceived by an individual to have hurt their feelings. 
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from being humiliated or treated with contempt and hostility, to being rejected or socially 
ostracized). We conclude the paper by discussing the implications of conceptualizing hurtful 
experiences within a dehumanization framework and future research within the domain of 
hurtful experiences.  
Hurt Feelings  
Hurt is broadly defined as the emotional injury, pain or distress caused by another 
(Leary & Springer, 2001; Vangelisti, 2009). Experiences of hurt feelings can range from 
slight discomfort in response to a perceived maltreatment from a colleague, to deep 
psychological pain and anguish in response to a loved one’s infidelity or betrayal (Fitness, 
2001; Fitness & Warburton, 2009). Therefore, in some cases the consequences of hurt 
feelings can be minor (e.g., forgetting to attend a lunch engagement with a best friend), or 
regarded as so severe (e.g., a serious relationship transgression such as an extra-marital 
affair) that the hurt person may feel it is necessary to terminate their relationship with the 
person who has hurt them (Vangelisti et al., 2005). Importantly, the experience of hurt 
feelings does not occur in isolation, but is interpersonal in nature (Vangelisti, 2009). Indeed, 
experiences of hurt often involve close others, with research demonstrating that close friends, 
romantic or dating partners, and family members account for 81% of the perpetrators of 
hurtful incidents (Leary, et al., 1998).  
While hurt may co-occur, or, is experienced or expressed alongside other emotions 
such as sadness, fear, anger, and shame, experiences of hurt feelings have distinct cognitive 
appraisals that yield different affective responses to the aforementioned emotions (Feeney, 
2005; Fitness & Warburton, 2009; Leary & Springer, 2001; MacDonald, 2009). More 
specifically, being hurt by another has been found to have different cognitive appraisals than 
anger and sadness, such that hurt-eliciting events are appraised as more unexpected and 
difficult to understand (relative to anger- and sadness-eliciting events) and are strongly 
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associated with confusion and distress (Fitness & Wurburton, 2009). Furthermore, research 
by Leary and Springer (2001) has demonstrated that a wide variety of negative emotions do 
not fully account for the variance in hurt feelings. These findings suggest that hurt cannot be 
reduced to a combination of other emotions (Leary & Springer, 2001; MacDonald, 2009), but 
should be regarded as a unique emotional state.  
 Currently, there is debate (and considerable ambiguity) in the literature as to the 
underlying cause of hurt feelings. This is not to say that many of the present perspectives do 
not have theoretical and predictive utility in their own right. Each conceptualization makes 
important predictions about the conditions under which hurt feelings are experienced, or how 
a person may appraise an event that may then cause them to experience hurt feelings. Below, 
we provide a brief account of each of these perspectives—and in doing so—raise important 
questions around each conceptualization’s capacity to provide a sufficient explanation for the 
cause of hurt feelings. This section is followed by a shift in focus in which we suggest that 
the primary reason for why each perspective offers a different conceptualization for the 
underlying cause of hurt feelings, lies in the fact that no one perspective is able to capture the 
full spectrum of hurtful experiences. Rather, we argue that the underlying cause of hurt 
feelings is dehumanization, and subsequently propose a dehumanization model of hurt 
feelings that is able to capture the full spectrum of experiences that may be considered 
hurtful. 
 Causes of hurt feelings. According to the relationship evaluation hypothesis (Leary 
& Springer, 2001), hurt occurs when a person (i.e., the target2 of another’s hurtful behavior) 
perceives the perpetrator (i.e., the transgressor) does not value the relationship to the same 
degree as the target. According to this theory, the defining feature of hurt feelings is a 
                                                 
2 We define the target as the individual who has experienced hurt feelings due to the 
behaviors of the perpetrator. We define the perpetrator as the individual who enacts the 
hurtful behavior in the first instance. 
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perceived relational devaluation. The target’s perception is that the perpetrator regards the 
relationship as less valuable, important or close than the target would like—and this is what 
causes hurt feelings (Leary & Springer, 2001). In contrast, other researchers (e.g., Vangelisti 
2001; Vangelisti & Young, 2001) have proposed that the defining feature of all hurtful 
experiences is that the hurtful act violates particular relationship norms or rules and are thus 
deemed transgressions. According to this perspective, relational transgressions that evoke 
hurt feelings are also marked by a heightened sense of victimization and vulnerability in the 
target of the transgression (Feeney, 2005; Shaver, 2009; Vangelisti, 2009). Although it has 
been suggested that these perspectives are not inconsistent with one another (i.e., hurt 
feelings are often evoked by relational transgressions and those transgressions usually imply 
low relational evaluations, Vangelisti, 2009), we—along with Feeney (2005)—argue that 
there are also hurtful experiences that occur within interpersonal contexts that cannot be 
adequately accounted for by the relational devaluation or relational transgression 
perspectives.  
For example, in regard to relational devaluations Feeney (2005) argues that there are a 
number of hurtful experiences within romantic relationships that cannot be explained by the 
relationship evaluation hypothesis (e.g., Leary & Springer, 2001). Specifically, Feeney 
argues that situations exist in which the hurtful behavior or event in fact signals that the 
perpetrator cares deeply about the target. Examples of such behaviors and events include a 
partner behaving in a jealous or distrusting manner (i.e., questioning a partner’s whereabouts) 
or acts of concealment that are intended to protect the partner (i.e., the target of hurt) or to 
maintain the relationship (e.g., withholding gossip). While such experiences may lead to hurt 
feelings (because the target feels that their partner does not trust them, or because the target is 
hurt by the fact that their partner would withhold information from them), the hurt did not 
result from a devaluation of the relationship. Rather, the experience of hurt may come about 
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because the perpetrator values the target and the relationship highly (Feeney, 2005). Feeney 
also challenged the role that relational transgressions (e.g., Vangelisti, 2001; Vangelisti & 
Young, 2001) play in the experience of hurt feelings. According to the transgression 
perspective, the perpetrator violates relationship norms or rules, which in turn, causes the 
target to feel hurt. According to Feeney, however, not all relationship transgressions cause 
hurt feelings, nor do all transgressions evoke a sense of personal and emotional injury 
resulting in hurt. For example, although respecting a partner’s privacy is one of the most 
important “rules” of marriage (Argyle & Henderson, 1985), Feeney argues that breaking such 
a rule is unlikely to be seen as hurtful because it would not elicit a sense of personal injury in 
the target.  
Drawing on attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002), 
Feeney (2005) extended on the relational devaluation and relational transgressions 
perspectives, suggesting that hurtful experiences (whether they be deemed as relational 
devaluations or relational transgressions) are only hurtful when they undermine or 
compromise the mental representations that a person holds about close relationships. 
According to attachment theory (Hazan & Shaver, 1987; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007), 
individuals harbor two complementary cognitive working models—a model of self 
(evaluations regarding one’s self-worth to receive love and comfort) and a model of others 
(evaluations regarding the reliability of significant others to meet needs of love, comfort and 
security, Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Gillath, Karantzas, & Fraley, 2016). According to 
Feeney, hurt is elicited only when relationship transgressions damage the positivity of these 
working models, such as a compromised belief that one is worthy of love, or that others are 
dependable sources of support. Based on Feeney’s perspective, therefore, hurt is associated 
with a sense of “personal injury” that involves damage to the target’s attachment internal 
working models.   
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In an alternative application of attachment theory to explain hurt feelings, Shaver et 
al. (2009) have proposed that rather than particular experiences compromising a person’s 
internal working models, hurtful experiences directly compromise (even destroy) a person’s 
fundamental and underlying sense of safety and security. That is, hurtful events compromise 
the primary goal of the attachment system—a feeling of felt security. However, this 
perspective does not account for experiences of hurt that do not threaten one’s attachment to 
others or sense of safety and security. That is, while we certainly do not disagree with the 
attachment-based perspectives of hurt feelings (Feeney, 2005; Shaver et al., 2009), there are 
often times when experiences of hurt are not the result of a threat or damage to a person’s 
attachment working models or sense of security.  
For instance, consider a work situation in which an individual’s efforts on a task are 
met with not only harsh, but also disparaging criticism from a known work colleague but 
someone with whom the individual does not work with closely. Given that criticism suggests 
to another that on some level the target is defective or flawed (Gottman, 1999), it is not 
surprising that criticism is often the most commonly reported hurtful experience (Leary et al., 
1998). Hence, due to a variety of reasons, being criticized is likely to cause the target of the 
criticism to feel hurt. These reasons may include: self-appraisal that their hard work was not 
good enough, that their efforts and time commitment went unnoticed, that they lack the 
capacity to complete the task effectively, or they were simply hurt by the disparaging and 
slanderous nature of the comments. This hurtful experience, however, is unlikely to damage 
the target’s attachment to others, their belief that they are worthy of love, or that others are 
dependable (because no attachment exists to the work colleague). Nor is this hurtful 
experience likely to threaten the target’s sense of safety and security. Hence, by limiting the 
explanation of hurt to an attachment-based conceptualization it becomes difficult to account 
for the hurt caused by a perpetrator that the target has no or minimal attachment to the target. 
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Indeed, although friends and romantic partners are often reported as the perpetrators of hurt, 
research by Leary et al. (1998) demonstrates that people also report being hurt by 
acquaintances and authority figures. We argue, therefore, that for a perspective to capture the 
full spectrum of hurtful experiences, it must be able to account for hurt feelings that are 
caused by perpetrators that the target does not have a strong connection to, or with. The 
attachment-based perspectives are geared towards explaining only the more severe or deep 
experiences of hurt, and thus by their very nature, are not equipped to account for the less 
severe and everyday experiences of hurt that—although do not “pierce one’s deep, visceral, 
generally unconscious sense of safety and security” (Shaver et al., 2009, pp. 99)—are 
nevertheless hurtful.  
Finally, MacDonald (2009) offers yet another theoretical perspective of hurtful 
experiences, arguing that “social injury” is the primary cause of hurt. Much like Feeney’s 
(2005) description of positive working models of others, social injury is defined as threats or 
damage to beliefs about one’s potential for seeking social connection (whether this be 
concerns about rejection and ostracism, or the availability of future social support, 
MacDonald, 2009). According to MacDonald, hurt is a form of social pain that arises in 
response to threats to, or losses of, social connection. This perspective is framed largely 
within the context of social exclusion, rejection and ostracism research in which threats to 
social connection may stimulate painful feelings (i.e., social pain) via some of the same 
physiological mechanisms activated by physical injury (e.g., Chen, Williams, Fitness, & 
Newton, 2008; Eisenberger, Jarcho, Lieberman, & Naliboff, 2006).  
According to MacDonald (2009), hurt only arises when events or behaviors carry 
messages relevant to one’s prospects of seeking or receiving social support or connection in 
the future. However, as argued above in regard to the attachment-based perspectives of hurt 
(i.e., Feeney, 2005; Shaver et al., 2009), this view does not account for hurtful experiences 
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that do not threaten or sever one’s connection to others, and in particular, the future 
availability of social support. That is, not all hurtful experiences involve threats to, or damage 
of, an individual’s future social connections. For example, although being treated 
instrumentally (e.g., being treated as a means to an end, used, or taken for granted, Leary et 
al., 1998) is often reported to be a hurtful experience, the behavior itself suggests that the 
target is needed or required in some manner because they may be utilized for a particular 
purpose, or have something to offer the individual who has hurt them. The reason such an 
experience causes hurt feelings is because it devalues the target and suggests they are only 
valuable for what they can offer.  
In this section, we have described a number of perspectives that have attempted to 
identify the key underlying cause of hurt feelings (i.e., Feeney, 2005; Leary, 2001; 
MacDonald, 2009; Shaver et al., 2009; Vangelisti, 2001; Vangelisti & Young, 2001). 
However, as we have identified, no one perspective or conceptualization is without its 
limitations. For example, in terms of the social support and attachment-based perspectives 
(i.e., Feeney, 2005; MacDonald, 2009; Shaver et al., 2009) key limitations include the 
inability to apply these perspectives to any interpersonal context irrespective of the degree of 
closeness that the target shares with the perpetrator. That is, these perspectives are limited to 
experiences of hurt in which the perpetrator of the hurtful behavior can only be a person that 
the target would normally turn to for love, comfort, support and security (i.e., their primary 
attachment figures or people that the target perceives as opportunities for social connection). 
Therefore, the application of these more relational-specific theories is often limited to include 
only contexts in which individuals have strong relational ties to another (as opposed to being 
hurt by the slanderous comments of a colleague [with whom no strong social connection may 
exist]).  
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Furthermore, the attachment-based perspectives (i.e., Feeney, 2005; Shaver et al., 
2009) by their very nature have difficulty accounting for varying levels in the severity of the 
experience of hurt feelings. This is because the attachment-based perspectives focus on the 
more severe and pronounced experiences and expressions of hurt feelings. Thus, attachment 
perspectives fail to take into account the day-to-day experiences of hurt that do not register as 
visceral or serious (relative to the actions of a close or significant other), but are nonetheless, 
hurtful. In fact, we argue that none of the current perspectives of the underlying cause of hurt 
feelings adequately capture the full range of interpersonal experiences that may cause 
someone to feel hurt. For example, the relationship evaluation hypothesis (Leary & Springer, 
2001) is unable to account for the hurt caused by a perpetrator that highly values the target 
and their relationship. In a similar vein, the relational transgression perspective (Vangelisti, 
2001; Vangelisti & Young, 2001) is also limited because not all relationship transgressions 
result in the target experiencing feelings of hurt, nor do all transgressions evoke a sense of 
emotional pain or personal injury that would result in hurt feelings (Feeney, 2005).  
As a way to remedy these limitations, we propose a dehumanization model of hurt 
feelings that not only captures and extends upon the conceptualizations presented above, but 
also allows for the study of hurt to cut across any interpersonal context or level of severity 
(i.e., our model can be applied to the most minor through to the most severe of hurtful 
experiences). In detailing this novel perspective to the study of hurt, we present an integrative 
model of hurt feelings in which we conceptualize the key underlying cause of hurt as the 
denial of humanness (i.e., dehumanization, Haslam, 2006). In the sections that follow, we 
define dehumanization and specify its associations with interpersonal and close relationship 
outcomes relevant to the experience of hurt feelings. We then present and discuss our 
proposed dehumanization model of hurt feelings.  
Dehumanization 
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Conceptualizations of dehumanization. Dehumanization is defined as perceiving or 
treating an individual or group as lacking human attributes that separate humans from non-
human entities, such animals or inanimate objects like machines and robots (Bain, Vaes & 
Leyens, 2014; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Traditionally, dehumanization has been 
conceptualized as an extreme phenomenon that has typically been examined in the context of 
mass violence (i.e., the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria), intense conflict (i.e., the Gaza-
Israel conflict, Kelman, 1976; Staub, 1989) and moral atrocities (i.e., the Jewish Holocaust, 
and the genocide against the Tutsi in Rawanda, Bandura, 1999; Opotow, 1990). Since this 
early work, the conceptualization of dehumanization has evolved to acknowledge that 
dehumanization can also occur in interpersonal contexts and is not limited to conditions bound 
by prejudice or inter-group conflict (for review see Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Haslam & 
Stratemeyer, 2016). Instead, dehumanization can also be conceptualized as a relatively regular 
phenomenon that occurs in commonplace social interactions. Indeed, denying human attributes 
to other people and likening them to nonhumans is in fact a subtle, everyday event that may 
occur in the absence of conflict and negative evaluations of the target (e.g., Leyens et al., 
2000, 2001, 2003; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). Furthermore—and as with hurt (e.g., Leary et 
al., 1998)—research suggests that dehumanization experienced within interpersonal contexts 
is most likely perpetrated by people from the target’s social network, which involves close 
others such as family and friends as well as co-workers, and other acquaintances (Adams, 
2014).  
Haslam’s Dual Model of Dehumanization. According to Haslam’s Dual Model of 
Dehumanization (2006), there are two distinct aspects to humanness that can be denied to others. 
The denial of human uniqueness (also referred to as “animalistic” dehumanization) refers to 
the denial of characteristics that are thought to distinguish humans from animals, such as 
intelligence, self-control, civility, competency, social refinement, and maturity. When denied 
Chapter 2 – The Experience of Hurt 21 
uniquely human attributes, people are likened to animals and seen as unintelligent, socially 
unrefined, primitive, irrational, or childlike (Haslam, 2006; Haslam, Loughnan & Holland, 
2013). This form of dehumanization commonly occurs in relation to racism and prejudice, 
such as anti-immigration lobbyists describing asylum seekers and refugees as “infectious 
diseases” or “invasive pests” (Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014).  
The denial of human nature (also referred to as “mechanistic” dehumanization) refers 
to the denial of characteristics understood as features that are central to, or typical of, humans 
but not of mechanistic objects (Haslam, 2006).  Such attributes include the ability to 
experience and express emotions, cognitive flexibility, and interpersonal warmth. When 
denied the attributes of human nature people are likened to objects, machines, or automata 
and seen as cold and heartless, rigid (i.e., pre-programmed), or valued only for the functions 
or purposes they can fulfill for another (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2013). This form of 
dehumanization is often examined within the context of medical practices (Haque & Waytz, 
2012) and organizational settings (Andrighetto, Baldissarri, & Volpato, 2016) in which 
individuals are objectified or treated as tools and perceived as commodities. Interestingly, 
within these contexts mechanistic dehumanization has often been considered to be functional 
or a necessary pre-condition in order to execute various work and medical-related tasks. For 
instance, the denial of human nature assists people in positions of power (i.e., medical 
professionals and managers) to make “difficult” decisions that may cause pain and suffering 
for others by allowing such decisions to be made in a more distant, cold, and (presumably) 
rational manner (Christoff, 2016). For example, a doctor thinking of their patients as 
mechanical systems made up of interacting parts, may be useful in certain diagnostic and 
problem-solving contexts such as complex surgeries and procedures (Haslam & Loughnan, 
2014). More recently, however, questions have been raised in regard to this proposed 
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functionality—in particular—whether engaging in mechanical dehumanization is ethically 
acceptable (for review see Christoff, 2016; Haque & Waytz, 2012). 
Dehumanization can also range in the way it is enacted, such that dehumanization can 
be perpetrated in a blatant and explicit manner or in a way that is subtle and implicit (Haslam, 
2006). An example of blatant and explicit dehumanization would include describing native 
inhabitants (i.e., Australian Aboriginals or Native Americans) as “primitive” or “savages”. At 
other times, however, dehumanization can be more subtle and implicit, in which people are 
denied humanness in more underhanded ways, such as being ascribed fewer human attributes or 
being implicitly, rather than explicitly, associated with nonhumans (Haslam et al., 2013). For 
example, “…this would be easier if you were flexible and not so stubborn in your thinking” is 
an instance of subtle and implicit dehumanization in which the target is denied human nature 
(i.e., mechanistic dehumanization—being treated as cognitively inflexible, rigid or pre-
programmed with only a narrow set of actions and abilities).  
Subtle or implicit dehumanization can also take the form of making a relative 
comparison in which one is viewed as encompassing less of a human characteristic(s) than 
another individual or group (Haslam, 2006). Examples of relative dehumanization are: “The 
social circles I am part of seem to discuss the more ‘big’ and ‘intellectual’ issues when 
compared to the things you and your friends talk about”, “Those people are classier than 
you”, and “You are so cold compared to my other friends” (Haslam et al., 2013). As can be 
seen in these examples, relative denials of humanness involve comparative claims that an 
individual or group is less human than another individual or group. With relative denials of 
humanness, the dehumanized target is not perceived as non-human per se but is seen as less 
human in comparison to oneself or another individual or group. This is in contrast to absolute 
denials of humanness that involve making non-human attributions about another individual or 
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group without a comparison (e.g., “You are just like a robot—cold and heartless” or “You 
live like some sort of dirty animal or Neanderthal”, Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2013).  
Dehumanization: The Underlying Cause of Hurt Feelings  
 Given that research examining interpersonal dehumanization is still in its infancy, it is 
not surprising that evidence for the association between the denial of humanness and the 
experience of hurt is relatively sparse. The preliminary work that has been undertaken, 
however, provides indirect evidence to suggest that denials of human uniqueness and human 
nature may indeed elicit hurt. For example, experimental work by Bastian and Haslam (2011) 
and qualitative work by Adams (2014) has found that the occurrence of dehumanization is 
associated with emotions such as shame, sadness and anger. While both studies did not 
directly measure hurt, the emotions reported to be associated with being the target of 
dehumanization are consistent with emotions found to be experienced alongside hurt (Feeney 
2005; Leary & Springer, 2001).  
Furthermore, Bastian and Haslam (2011) reported that some experiences of 
dehumanization caused the targets to experience what they termed “deconstructive cognitive 
states” (i.e., reduced clarity of thought, cognitive inflexibility, and an absence of meaningful 
thought). The deconstructive cognitive states reported by Bastian and Haslam (in which the 
target of dehumanization experiences a reduced ability to make sense of the situation) are 
similar to the cognitive appraisals that are found to accompany hurtful experiences (i.e., the 
hurtful event was unexpected, difficult to understand, and strongly associated with feelings of 
confusion; Fitness & Wurburton, 2009). Thus, despite the relative paucity of empirical 
evidence demonstrating the link between interpersonal dehumanization and the experience of 
hurt, the research to date suggests that experiences of dehumanization are associated with 
similar emotions and cognitive appraisals to that of investigations into the experience of hurt. 
However, we highlight that the research to date provides only indirect evidence and clearly 
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much work is required to confirm the empirical associations between dehumanization and the 
experience of hurt. Nevertheless, this preliminary evidence speaks to the proposed connection 
between dehumanization and hurt. In the following section, we provide a detailed discussion 
of our conceptual framework linking dehumanization to hurt feelings. 
Dehumanization Model of Hurt 
According to our dehumanization model of hurt, the extent to which various 
interpersonal experiences are considered hurtful is dependent upon their relative positioning 
along the two dimensions upon which humanness is denied—namely—the denial of human 
uniqueness and the denial of human nature. In order to clearly delineate the distinction 
between dehumanizing and non-dehumanizing behaviors, we also include examples of 
negative interpersonal experiences that are not hurtful to illustrate how these behaviors reflect 
an absence of the denial of humanness. That is, although experiences can be negative, if the 
target of the negative behavior is not denied their sense of humanness, we contend that the 
experience of hurt should not ensue.  
The associations between different hurtful experiences and the particular dimension(s) 
of humanness that they deny are illustrated in Figure 1. As shown in this figure, each of the 
two dimensions is anchored to range from high to low levels of the denials of human nature 
and human uniqueness respectively, yielding four quadrants of dehumanization. These 
quadrants are: (1) high denial of human uniqueness and low denial of human nature, (2), high 
denial of human nature and low denial of human uniqueness (3) high denial of human nature 
and high denial of human uniqueness, and (4) low denial of human nature and low denial of 
human uniqueness.  
It is important to note that the description of hurtful experiences shown in Figure 1 
across the four quadrants represent a consolidation of the hurtful behaviors and events that 
have previously been identified as hurtful experiences (see Feeney, 2004; Leary et al., 1998; 
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Vangelisti et al., 2005). Furthermore, the hurtful behaviors and events included across some 
of the quadrants include additional hurtful experiences that we suggest cannot be readily 
accounted for by previous conceptualizations of hurt (e.g., Feeney 2005; Leary & Spinger, 
2001; MacDonald, 2009; Shaver et al., 2009; Vangelisti, 2001), or have not been explicitly 
identified as hurtful in prior literature (e.g., Feeney, 2004; Leary et al., 1998; Vangelisti et al., 
2005). Below we describe each of the four quadrants of our dehumanization model of hurt 
commencing with hurtful experiences that are exclusively related to the denial of human 
uniqueness. 
Hurtful experiences that entail a high denial of human uniqueness and low 
denial of human nature. Hurtful experiences that can be considered to encompass the denial 
of human uniqueness (i.e., explicitly or implicitly likening another to animals) are presented in 
the bottom left quadrant of Figure 1. In terms of the hurtful experiences previously identified 
in the literature (i.e., Vangelisti et al., 2005), these include: contempt and hostility. According 
to Vangelisti et al. (2005), these types of hurtful experiences involve being spoken to or 
treated aggressively and include reports from participants such as “It was communicated in a 
nasty way” and “It [i.e., the hurtful comment] was said in a mean way”. In addition, we also 
describe particular interpersonal behaviors that may not appear dehumanizing and hurtful at 
first glance but do indeed cause people to feel denigrated and inept (i.e., the denial of human 
uniqueness), and consequently, lead to the experience of hurt feelings. These additional 
hurtful experiences—that also epitomize the denial of human uniqueness—are defined as 
undermining and interfering social support (i.e., social support that is undercutting of a 
person’s abilities [Bolger & Amarel, 2007; Cutrona, 2012] or controlling or intrusive ways of 
caring for another that stifles autonomy [Kunce & Shaver, 1994]). Below, we discuss how 
each of these hurtful experiences involves the denial of human uniqueness. 
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According to Matsumoto, Hwang and Frank (2016), contempt towards another is to 
make a statement about one’s status and inherent superiority and includes appraisals of others 
as incompetent or lacking intelligence. Similarly, Gottman (1999) proposed that contempt 
involves elevating one’s self above another person and communicates an element of disgust 
that is intended to demonstrate disapproval of another. Being the target of contempt is a 
hurtful experience because the perpetrator has treated the target as inferior—and in doing 
so—has communicated to the target that they are flawed or debased. In a similar vein, 
hostility is defined as a “negative attitude toward others, consisting of enmity, denigration, 
and ill will” (Smith, 1994, p. 26). When an individual becomes hostile they often express 
irritation and anger, and behave in an aggressive, attacking, antagonistic and often spiteful 
manner—which also communicates to the target a level of resentment and impatience (Baron 
et al. 2007; Pope, Smith & Rhodewalt, 1990). Hence, what underpins and perpetuates 
contempt and hostility (and also defines them as the denial of human uniqueness) is the 
perception that the target is foolish, flawed, irrational, or debased. Therefore, we argue that to 
treat someone with contempt or hostility elicits hurt feelings because it denies them qualities 
and characteristics thought to distinguish humans from animals, such as sophistication, 
rationality, and intelligence.  
As part of our dehumanization perspective of hurt feelings, we argue that there are 
also interpersonal experiences that may appear positive, but which in fact paradoxically lead 
to hurt feelings through dehumanization. In regard to our dehumanization model of hurt 
feelings, we define undermining and interfering social support as either social support that is 
undercutting or caregiving that is compulsive and intrusive. Not surprisingly, a large body of 
research has demonstrated that support from one’s partner, family and other members of one’s 
social network is associated with positive outcomes, such as improved mental health and 
higher levels of subjective wellbeing than when support is not rendered (e.g., Cohen, 2004; 
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Feeney & Thrush, 2010; Feeney & Collins, 2014; Kunce & Shaver, 1994). However, a 
seeming puzzling finding across some of the social support literature is that the provision 
social support may also be associated with negative mental health outcomes and poorer 
emotional wellbeing in support recipients (Bolger & Amarel, 2007; Cutrona, 2012; Iida, 
Seidman, Shrout, Fujita, & Bolger, 2008). According to Bolger and Amarel (2007), this 
negative outcome emerges when the support provided implies a lack of efficacy or ability in 
the support recipient. That is, social support that questions or challenges the recipient’s 
competence leads to negative outcomes such as decreases in mood and self-esteem, and 
heightened distress (Bolger & Amarel, 2007; Cutrona, 2012; Iida et al. 2008). 
Similarly, within the caregiving literature there are some forms of support behavior 
that may appear positive, but in fact paradoxically cause hurt feelings through 
dehumanization. These include two related, but distinct, forms of care rendered to a partner—
compulsive caregiving and controlling caregiving (Karantzas, 2017; Kunce & Shaver, 1994).  
Compulsive caregiving is defined as the tendency to become overinvolved in a partner’s 
problems and is characterized by repeated and invasive comments on the partner’s actions 
(Karantzas, 2017; Kunce & Shaver, 1994). As a function of this over involvement, the partner 
engaging in compulsive caregiving becomes intrusive and undermining by interfering in an 
individual’s capacity to try and deal with a problem or challenge using their own skills and 
abilities, or by leveraging their abilities off those of their partner’s (Karantzas, 2017). 
Similarly, controlling caregiving is defined as domineering, commanding, and restrictive 
behavior, through which the support provided is more controlling than it is cooperative 
(Karantzas, 2017; Kunce & Shaver, 1994). Instead of respecting the partner’s ability to make 
a decision or execute a task, the controlling partner tells their partner what to do (i.e., insists 
that the partner adopts their approach), and in the process expresses a lack of confidence in 
their partner’s capacity to behave in an agentic and independent manner. Therefore, support 
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or care that denies the recipient autonomy, or communicates to a person that they lack 
competence and skill inherently denies the recipient core characteristics that are related to 
human uniqueness (i.e., characteristics that distinguish humans from animals). To this end, a 
partner can engage in “support-like” behavior that interferes with the partner’s capacity to 
manage on his or her own, in which the “support” is often rendered even when the partner has 
not requested help. Such behavior is considered dehumanizing (and hurtful) because it treats 
the target as if they lack uniquely human attributes such as competence, intelligence, and 
agency (i.e., foresight, thinking, and self-control) and consequently likens the target to an 
animal.  
Importantly, the undermining and interfering social support we outline as hurtful—
due to their denials of human uniqueness—cannot be accounted for by existing 
conceptualizations of hurt feelings (Feeney, 2005; Leary & Springer, 2001; MacDonald, 
2009; Shaver et al., 2009; Vangelisti, 2001; Vangelisti & Young, 2001). This is because the 
conceptualizations proposed in the past all center around an actual social pain, a 
personal/relationship threat (a future social pain), or damage to the perception that others can 
be relied upon for social support, comfort, and/or safety. These pains, threats and damaged 
perceptions include: relational devaluations, relational transgressions, worries about lack of 
receiving support in the future, damage to one’s attachment working models of self and other, 
or a lost sense of felt security. Therefore, past conceptualizations limit thinking around what 
is hurtful to behaviors that are largely viewed as “negative”. This means that behaviors that 
appear positive but nonetheless undermine an individual are excluded as behaviors that cause 
hurt feelings or are unlikely to be considered as hurtful experiences. In fact, these seemingly 
positive behaviors demonstrate that people hurt each other even though they value and are 
invested in the relationships that they share. Therefore, as part of our dehumanization model 
of hurt feelings, support behavior that is characterized as limiting or depressing a person’s 
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capacity to demonstrate autonomy, competence and efficacy, need to be considered as hurtful 
by the very nature of the human qualities that they deny in the recipient—human uniqueness.  
Hurtful experiences that entail a high denial of human nature and low denial of 
human uniqueness. Hurtful experiences that entail the denial of human nature (i.e., explicitly 
or implicitly likening another to machines or inanimate objects, see top right quadrant of 
Figure 1) are characterized by an emotional or physical detachment from another, by which the 
target may be treated as if they have no feelings, or are only of value for their use (Haslam, 
2006). To deny human nature to another is to deny them the fundamental need to forge and 
maintain meaningful and rewarding relationships (Bastian & Haslam, 2010). Not surprisingly, 
some of the most common emotional responses to the denial of human nature include feelings 
of relational loss (due to the disruption of social connectedness), sadness, and anger (Bastian 
& Haslam, 2011). Importantly, the psychological needs that individuals look to satisfy within 
close relationships, such as love, comfort, a sense of belonging, and a sense of feeling valued 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 2007), are all undermined by the denial of human 
nature.  
The hurtful experiences previously identified by researchers (i.e., Feeney, 2004; 
Leary et al., 1998; Vangelisti et al., 2005) that are high on the denial of human nature include: 
active disassociation (i.e., explicit rejection, social ostracism, or overt signals of disinterest in 
another, Feeney, 2005; Leary et al., 1998; Vangelisti et al., 2005), passive disassociation (i.e., 
implicit rejection, such as being ignored or excluded, Feeney, 2005; Leary et al., 1998; Vangelisti 
et al., 2005), conditional regard (i.e., being used or objectified [treated as an object or instrument], 
treated as a means to an end, or taken for granted, Leary et al., 1998), and betrayal (i.e., the 
violation of relationship norms relative to loyalty and trust, such as infidelity and deception, 
Feeney, 2005; Leary et al., 1998). In addition to how we classify these hurtful experiences as the 
denial of human nature, we also describe how defensive communication styles (i.e., withdrawal 
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and stonewalling) can provoke hurt feelings because they are also underpinned by the denial of 
human nature. We now discuss each of these hurtful experiences that we argue constitute the 
denial of human nature. 
Dissociation (be it active or passive) has consistently been reported as a hurtful 
experience (see Feeney, 2004; Leary et al., 1998; Vangelisti et al., 2005) and is characterized 
by either explicit or implicit abandonment, exclusion, ostracism, relationship denigration, and 
disinterest towards another. Not surprisingly, disassociation can be a painful experience that 
constitutes a threat to one’s sense of meaningful existence (Steele, Kidd & Castano, 2015). 
Social bonds are central to psychological and physical wellbeing (Fitness, 2001; Steele et al., 
2015), and disruptions to them can have significant negative outcomes such as increasing 
feelings of hurt, but also, reducing a person’s self-confidence over time (Feeney, 2004; 
Williams, 2007). Interestingly, Bastian and Haslam (2010) found that the denial of human 
nature (as opposed to the denial of human uniqueness) was consistently associated with 
experiences that suggest a level of rejection (e.g., social exclusion/ostracism). In particular, being 
socially ostracized led participants to perceive themselves as harboring machine-like qualities such 
as being emotionally inert, cold, and rigid (Bastian & Haslam, 2010).  
According to both Leary et al. (1998) and Feeney (2004) disassociation can be active 
or passive. Active disassociation from another includes explicit rejection, abandonment, 
ostracism and the denial or retraction of expressions of love and commitment (Feeney, 2004; 
Leary et al., 1998). On the other hand, passive disassociation includes ignoring another 
person (implicit rejection) and excluding them from plans and activities (Feeney, 2004). 
However, whether an individual engages in active or passive disassociation, both forms of 
disassociation may be perceived as disregarding the target’s existence (i.e., the denial of 
human nature; Fiske, 1991). Additionally, insensitivity (a form of passive dissociation in 
which the partner’s feeling or wishes are ignored; Ruehlman & Karoly, 1991) can also disrupt 
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the experience of one’s humanity. For instance, Karantzas, Haslam, Simpson, and Pizzirani 
(2018) found that insensitivity was positively associated with the perpetration of dehumanization 
within a romantic relationship. Insensitivity is characterized by having limited or no concern for 
the partner’s feelings and is evident through thoughtlessness and inconsideration of another. 
The insensitive and dehumanizing perpetrator is often emotionally uninvolved or lacks 
genuine relatedness to the target, and considers them in an indifferent way (Fiske, 1991; 
Ruehlman & Karoly, 1991). Therefore, rejecting hurtful experiences (i.e., disassociation) are 
considered to be the denial of human nature because the perpetrator of these actions perceives 
and treats the target of the hurt in an indifferent way; much the same way one would treat an 
inanimate object, (e.g., with both a lack of concern and sympathy because the inanimate 
object does not have the ability to experience or express emotions).  
Another form of rejection previously identified in the literature to be a hurtful 
experience and one that we argue is hurtful because it denies people human nature is betrayal 
(i.e., the violation of relationship norms relative to loyalty and trust, such as infidelity and 
deception, see Feeney, 2004; Leary et al., 1998; Vangelisti et al., 2005). According to Fitness 
(2001), betrayal is not merely about violating relationship norms; rather, betrayal implies the 
rejection or discounting of another. Essentially, Fitness argues, “betrayal means that one 
party in a relationship acts in a way that favors his or her own interests at the expense of the 
other party’s interests (pp. 73)”. Hence, betrayal—in its many forms—is likely to be perceived 
by the target of the hurt as a devaluation of the relationship with the perpetrator (e.g., “My 
partner does not care about my feelings” or “My mother thinks I am insignificant”), and 
consequently a denial of human nature.  Therefore, to betray another (e.g., infidelity and 
other acts of deception) can be conceptualized as a form rejection that is hurtful because the 
experience implies a level of relational devaluation, or the realization that one’s partner does 
not hold oneself or the relationship in high regard (Fitness, 2001).   
Chapter 2 – The Experience of Hurt 32 
Conditional regard is the last hurtful experience that has been previously identified by 
researchers (see Leary et al., 1998) to be included in this section on behaviors that entail a 
high denial of human nature and low denial of human uniqueness. Conditional regard is 
therefore positioned within the top right quadrant of our dehumanization model of hurt 
feelings (see Figure 1). Defined by experiences in which the target is objectified, treated as a 
means to an end, used, or taken for granted (Leary et al., 1998), conditional regard has clear 
associations with the denial of human nature. For example, consider a situation described by 
Bastian and Haslam (2011) in which a person discovers that the real reason a newly developed 
friendship was initiated was because their new ‘friend’ was interested in getting closer to an 
influential and important relative of theirs. This devaluating experience demonstrates how the 
hurtful everyday actions of others can be representative of dehumanization. That is, and as 
can be seen in the example above, when denied attributes reflective of human nature people 
are likened to objects or machines (i.e., treated instrumentally) because they are valued only 
for the functions or purposes they can fulfil for another (Haslam, 2006; Haslam et al., 2013).  
Defensive communication styles (most often witnessed in times of relational conflict) 
such as stonewalling and withdrawal (Eldridge & Christensen, 2002; Heavey, Laney, & 
Christensen, 1993; Gottman, 1999) also portray a sense of indifference to another through 
either active or passive avoidance of an interaction. Withdrawal is most often witnessed in 
conflict interactions characterized by a dyadic pattern termed “demand-withdrawal” (Eldridge & 
Baucom, 2012). During this type of communication, a person demands or pressures for the other 
person to change, which is met with withdrawing behaviors by the other person (i.e., half-hearted 
involvement, avoiding discussions, and walking away, Eldridge & Baucom, 2012). Likewise, 
stonewalling (a form of withdrawal) is defined as a total lack of listening and a “tuning out” in 
response to another’s request for change (Gottman, 1991). According to Noller (2012), 
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withdrawal as a conflict style is seen as involving low concern for another that creates a sense of 
distance and disconnection between the members of the dyad.  
Not surprisingly then, defensive communication patterns rank among the most 
destructive and least effective interaction patterns in couples’ problem-solving endeavors and 
are consistently associated with poor relationship and individual outcomes, such as 
relationship dissatisfaction, heightened distress, and negative affect (e.g., K. J. Baucom, 
Baucom & Christensen, 2015; Eldridge & Christensen, 2002; Schrodt, Witt & Shimkowski, 
2014). In addition to these negative outcomes, we argue that when one person becomes silent 
or refuses to engage in conversation during a time of conflict, such behavior is likely to 
undermine the other person’s perception of himself or herself as a valued member of the 
relationship because their partner has acted in a way that demonstrates little consideration for 
their feelings (i.e., the partner has acted in an insensitive manner, likening their partner to an 
inanimate object not worthy of consideration). To this end, defensive communication can be 
considered a behavior that results in the experience of hurt. 
Hurtful experiences that entail both the denial of human uniqueness and human 
nature. The hurtful experiences presented thus far reflect either the denial of human 
uniqueness or human nature, but not both. Criticism and humiliation (see bottom right 
quadrant of Figure 1) are two broad behaviors that may tap both dimensions of 
dehumanization either separately or simultaneously. Criticism is defined “as negative verbal 
comments about one’s behavior, appearance, or personal characteristics” (pp. 497, Feeney, 
2004) and involves the expression of disapproval that is usually aimed at another’s personality 
or character and is based on the intention to insult or blame (Gottman, 1999). Criticism is 
dehumanizing in that a critical insult attacks a person’s sense of self by pointing out the 
fundamental or uniquely human qualities that they lack (e.g., lacking cognitive flexibility or 
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social refinement), or by highlighting similarities that they share with animals or machines 
(e.g., being seen as irrational or cold).  
To elucidate, consider a situation in which one member of a couple is not willing to 
change their mind or behavior despite there being no good reason to maintain this perspective.  In 
this challenging—yet not uncommon couple interaction—the partner requesting change may 
criticize their partner for being stubborn or rigid in their thinking and behavior. Such a critical 
remark, although rational (and possibly justifiable) is at the very least mechanistic dehumanization 
of one’s partner because it suggests they perceive their partner’s thought processes as inflexible 
(i.e., pre-programmed and machine-like). Hence, in this scenario the perpetrator has expressed 
disapproval (i.e., criticism) aimed towards the target’s personality or character (and in the process 
denied their partner fundamental human nature qualities).  
The distinction between which dehumanization dimension the criticizing behavior 
corresponds to, however, depends largely on what it is that is being criticized. To this end, 
criticism can target characteristics that exclusively reflect the denial of human nature (as can been 
seen in the example above) or the denial of human uniqueness. There are also instances in which 
the criticism of another is leveled in a manner that encompasses the denial of both dimensions of 
humanness. For example, “You are just too stupid to feel anything” demonstrates an instance 
where the criticizing behavior can tap both dehumanization dimensions simultaneously. 
Whereas, “You are so stubborn and inflexible” or “Stop being irrational, you are 
embarrassing me” are both examples of criticism that separately tap the human nature and 
human uniqueness dimensions, respectively. That is, relational problems and/or conflict—in 
which criticism is likely to feature—often reflect competing ideas about a wide range of possible 
relationship issues, such as a lack of care and concern, problems with the expression of feelings, or 
issues of competency around the achievement of goals or resolving challenges. To this end, when a 
person criticizes another, what determines the extent to which the criticism taps the human nature 
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dimension, the human uniqueness dimension, or both, depends largely on the context from which the 
criticism has occurred. For example, is the conflict or relationship problem about qualities that are 
uniquely human, or qualities that are fundamental to human nature? Or does the issue or conflict bring 
both denials of humanness into play because of either the topic itself, or the actions of the perpetrator? 
Such questions highlight the person by situation interaction that is at play for hurtful experiences that 
may tap both dimensions of dehumanization either separately or simultaneously. 
Similarly, humiliation (engaging in behaviors such as teasing, mockery, sarcasm and 
ill-conceived humor to abase one’s pride or reduce their social status) also represents a range 
of hurtful experiences that we argue can be classified as the denial of human uniqueness or 
human nature.  Furthermore, humiliation—in which the perpetrator aims to incite shame in the 
target—has previously been identified in the literature as a hurtful experience (see Leary et al., 
1998; Vangelisti et al., 2005). Humiliation involves teasing or embarrassing the target about their 
particular shortcomings, with research demonstrating that such experiences lead people to feel they 
have been dehumanized (Bastian & Haslam, 2011). Importantly, humiliation may also tap both 
dimensions of dehumanization either separately or simultaneously (as is the case with 
criticism). For example, “You are so cold and insensitive, you should be ashamed of 
yourself” demonstrates how a perpetrator’s attempt to humiliate another can be relevant to 
both dimensions of humanness. Whereas, humiliation that involves treating the target as inferior 
and socially unrefined (and subsequently teasing or humiliating them about such shortcomings 
[e.g., “You are so uncouth”]) exclusively reflects the denial of human uniqueness.  
Negative experiences that entail a low denial of human nature and a low denial of 
human uniqueness. The key focus of this paper has been to map a wide range of hurtful 
experiences onto Haslam’s (2006) Dual Model of Dehumanization. However, the 
dehumanization framework presented above also facilitates the mapping of negative 
interpersonal experiences that do not encompass, or are low, on the denial of human 
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uniqueness and human nature (see top left quadrant of Figure 1). The purpose of the inclusion 
of negative experiences that do not entail the denial of humanness is to demonstrate that the 
underlying cause of hurt is not that the experience is perceived as negative, but because the 
experience is dehumanizing. Therefore, we argue that negative experiences that do not deny 
another’s humanness (i.e., liken them to animals or machines) are unlikely to cause hurt 
feelings.  
According to Haslam (2014), an interaction can be appraised as negative (i.e., not 
desirable, optimistic, or lacking positivity), without being dehumanizing. That is, just because 
an interaction is perceived to be negative does not qualify the experience as the denial of 
humanness. Consider the following situations: a romantic couple disagreeing on how best to 
combat their current financial strain or housemates arguing over whose turn it is to clean. 
Across these distinct situations, if both parties afford and maintain a sense of respect and 
dignity for one another, in which they refrain from becoming aggressive, avoid humiliating 
each other, or do not engage in disassociation or defensive communication (e.g., by ignoring 
the other or withdrawing from the situation), then such incidents would not constitute the 
denial of humanness regardless of the fact they are likely to be perceived as “negative” by all 
parties involved. According to our dehumanization model of hurt, hurt occurs when 
interpersonal experiences are evinced within an interaction that reflects denials of either or 
both dimensions of dehumanization. To this end, if an experience is characterized by 
behaviors such as a lack of respect for one another in which one individual tries to undermine 
the value of the other’s perspective through mockery and condescension (denial of human 
uniqueness/and or human nature), treats the other with contempt and hostility (denial of 
human uniqueness), or is rejecting and acts indifferently (denial of human nature), then the 
experience of hurt will ensue. Therefore, although some interpersonal experiences are 
perceived as negative, if they encompass little to any dehumanization, then hurt feelings should 
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not be incited. Thus, the classification of negative experiences as dehumanizing and hurtful 
cannot be based solely on a target’s perception that the perpetrator’s behavior was negative, but 
whether that behavior denied them full or proper humanness (Haslam, 2014).   
Additionally, within interpersonal contexts, it is also likely for people to directly liken 
others to animals or machines in admiring or even loving ways (Haslam, Loughnan, Reynolds 
& Wilson, 2007). Such examples can include: a co-worker’s admiration of another’s ability 
to work long hours, describing them as ‘machine-like’, or, a mother likening her child to a 
‘monkey’ because of their cheeky and playful behavior. Although from a definitional 
standpoint these examples could be conceptualized as dehumanization, the behavior is 
unlikely to promote inhumane treatment of the other (Haslam, 2014) or cause hurt feelings. 
People are only truly dehumanized when the likening is derogatory (Haslam et al., 2007). 
Thus, when a dehumanizing comment is delivered with affect connoting admiration and 
positivity (e.g., “aw, you little cheeky monkey”) it is unlikely to elicit hurt feelings in the target. 
We therefore contend that for a dehumanizing experience to cause hurt feelings the incident must 
liken the target to an animal or a machine in a derogatory or deprecating manner. For example, 
verbal criticism such as “You are just like a robot—cold and heartless” (denial of human 
nature, see top right quadrant of Figure 1) or being perceived as inferior and treated with 
contempt and hostility (denial of human uniqueness, see bottom left quadrant of Figure 1) 
would constitute denials of humanness that are hurtful.  
Implications and Future Directions 
The dehumanization model of hurt proposed in this paper has a number of important 
implications for the future study of hurt feelings. First and most importantly, our model 
proposes a completely novel perspective regarding the key underlying cause of hurt. That is, 
the essence of a hurtful experience is the denial of humanness rather than relationship 
devaluation or transgressions, threats/damage to attachment security or internal working 
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models, or threats to future social connections. According to our dehumanization model of 
hurt, the denial of humanness cuts across all existing perspectives in that all previous 
explanations of hurt encompass dehumanization on some level. To this end, our model 
provides a parsimonious account of hurt by situating hurtful experiences previously identified 
by researchers within a two-dimensional space pertaining to the denial of human nature 
and/or the denial of human uniqueness. Hence, our model helps to reconcile the debates that 
have ensued regarding the underlying cause of hurt. 
Second, by suggesting that the experience of hurt is underpinned by denying another 
humanness, our model assumes that hurt does not purely reside in some disruption to the 
function of close relationships—an implicit assumption of all other perspectives pertaining to 
hurt feelings. While we believe that the experience of hurt is an interpersonal phenomenon, 
the hurtful experience need not be relational in nature, rather, it need only compromise one’s 
personal sense of humanness. This aspect of our model broadens our understanding regarding 
the contexts in which hurt can ensue. We contend that the experience of hurt need not be 
limited to the context of close relationships but can include any interpersonal context in 
which a person is denied humanness. By extension, hurt feelings can occur in workplaces, or 
sporting and volunteering contexts, to name but a few. In fact, the experience of hurt can 
occur in any context in which a person is treated as a means to an end, assumed to lack 
intelligence or appear rigid and narrow minded, viewed as overly emotional and irrational, or 
perceived as cold and to lack emotion.  
Third, our model extends our understanding of hurt feelings to include hurtful 
experiences that have not been previously considered within the study of hurt, but that we 
contend are indeed hurtful. The inclusion of behaviors such as undermining and interfering 
social support, highlight that the experience of hurt need not emerge from an overtly negative 
place in which social threats and punishments may ensue. Rather, the experience of hurt can 
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emerge from seemingly caring acts by another—acts that to date have not figured in our 
understanding of hurt feelings. 
The dehumanization model of hurt proposed in this paper can provide an important 
way forward for investigating hurtful experiences within interpersonal relationships. 
However, given that this paper provides the first exposition of this model, future research will 
need to establish the empirical associations proposed to exist between the denial of 
humanness and hurtful experiences. Furthermore, future research would need to establish the 
associations between the denial of humanness and the experience of hurt across varying 
interpersonal contexts to confirm that the hurtful experiences are not limited to the domain of 
close personal relationships. These future research directions would help to provide important 
“proof-of-concept” evidence for the model proposed in this paper. 
Conclusion 
The study of hurt feelings has been approached from a variety of perspectives, all of 
which have proposed different underlying causes for the experience of hurt. As a result, our 
understanding as to the cause of hurt remains unclear. As a way to reconcile existing 
perspectives and significantly advance our understanding of hurtful experiences, we draw on 
the dehumanization literature to propose a model in which we argue that the key cause of hurt 
is the denial of humanness. In doing so, we integrate dehumanization, a largely studied inter-
group phenomenon, to gain insight into hurtful experiences within interpersonal contexts. The 
proposed model reconciles previous perspectives of hurt (e.g., Feeney 2005; Leary & 
Spinger, 2001; MacDonald, 2009; Shaver et al., 2009; Vangelisti, 2001; Vangelisti & Young, 
2001) by capturing all forms of hurtful experiences outlined as part of previous research (e.g., 
Feeney, 2004; Leary et al., 1998; Vangelisti et al., 2005) within a single conceptual 
framework. As a result, the proposed model does not limit the study of hurt to the context of 
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close personal relationships but extends research into hurt feelings to any interpersonal 
context in which humanness is denied. 
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Figure 1. Dehumanization Model of Hurt  
Note. Criticism and Humiliation appear in the bottom left, top right and bottom right 
quadrants to denote that these experiences can tap the dehumanization dimensions separately 
or simultaneously.  
  
Chapter 2 – The Experience of Hurt 42 
 
References 
Adams, S. (2014). Feeling less than human: Exploring the causes and consequences of 
dehumanization from the target’s perspective (Doctoral dissertation). ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses Global database. 
Andrighetto, L., Baldissarri, C., & Volpato, C. (2016). (Still) modern times: Objectification 
at work. European Journal of Social Psychology, 0, 00—00.  
Argyle, M., & Henderson, M. (1985). The anatomy of relationships. London: Heinemann. 
Baxter, 
Bain, P., Vaes, G., & Leyens, J-P. (2014). Humanness and Dehumanization. Psychology 
Press: New York, NY. 
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 3, 193—29. 
Baron, K. G., Smith, T. W., Butner, J., Nealey-Moore, J., Hawkins, M. W., & Uchino, B. N. 
(2007). Hostility, anger, and marital adjustment: Concurrent and prospective 
associations with psychosocial vulnerability. Journal of behavioral medicine, 30(1), 
1—10. 
Bartholomew, K., & Horowitz, L. M. (1991). Attachment styles among young adults: a test 
of a four-category model. Journal of personality and social psychology, 61(2), 226. 
Bastian, B., & Haslam, N. (2010). Excluded from humanity: The dehumanizing effects of 
social ostracism. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(1), 107—113. 
Bastian, B., & Haslam, N. (2011). Experiencing dehumanization: Cognitive and emotional 
effects of everyday dehumanization. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 33(4), 295—
303. 
Haslam, N. (2014). What is dehumanization? In P. Bain, G. Vaes, & J-P. Leyens, (Eds.), 
Humanness and dehumanization (pp 34—48). Psychology Press: New York, NY. 
Chapter 2 – The Experience of Hurt 43 
Baucom, K. J., Baucom, B. R., & Christensen, A. (2015). Changes in dyadic communication 
during and after integrative and traditional behavioral couple therapy. Behaviour Research 
and Therapy, 65, 18—28. 
Bolger, N., & Amarel, D. (2007). Effects of support visibility on adjustment to stress: 
Experimental evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 458—475. 
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss (Vol. 1). New York: Basic Books. 
Bowlby, J. (1982). Attachment and loss: Retrospect and prospect. American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry, 52, 664—678. 
Chen, Z., Williams, K. D., Fitness, J., & Newton, N. C. (2008). When hurt won’t heal: Exploring 
the capacity to relive social and physical pain. Psychological Science 19(8), 789—795. 
Christoff, K. (2014). Dehumanization in organizational settings: some scientific and ethical 
considerations. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 8, 1 – 5. 
Cohen, S. (2004). Social relationships and health. American psychologist, 59(8), 676. 
Cutrona, C. E. (2012). Recent advances in research on social support in couples. In P. Noller 
and G. Karantzas (Eds.) The Wiley-Blackwell handbook of couples and family 
relationships, (pp. 392—405). West Sussex, UK: Blackwell Publishing. 
Eisenberger, N. I., Jarcho, J. M., Lieberman, M. D., & Naliboff, B. D. (2006). An experimental 
study of shared sensitivity to physical pain and social rejection. Pain, 126, 132—138. 
Eldridge, K. A., & Baucom, B. (2012). Demand-withdraw communication in couples. In P. Noller 
& G. C. Karantzas (Eds.), The Wiley-Blackwell handbook of couples and family 
relationships (pp. 144—158). West Sussex, UK: Wiley Blackwell. 
Eldridge, K. A., & Christensen, A. (2002). Demand-withdraw communication during couple 
conflict: A review and analysis. In P. Noller & J. A. Feeney (Eds.), Understanding marriage: 
Developments in the study of couple interaction (pp. 289–322). New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Chapter 2 – The Experience of Hurt 44 
Feeney, B. C., & Collins, N. L. (2015). A new look at social support: A theoretical 
perspective on thriving through relationships. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 19(2), 113—147. 
Feeney, B. C., & Thrush, R. L. (2010). Relationship influences on exploration in adulthood: 
the characteristics and function of a secure base. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 98(1), 57—76. 
Feeney, J. A. (2004). Hurt feelings in couple relationships: Toward integrative models of the 
negative effects of hurtful events. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 21, 487—
508.  
Feeney, J. A. (2005). Hurt feelings in couple relationships: Exploring the role of attachment and 
perceptions of personal injury. Personal Relationships, 12, 253—271. 
Feeney, J. A. (2009). When Love Hurts: Understanding Hurtful Events in Couple 
Relationships. In A. Vangelisti (Ed.), Feeling Hurt in Close Relationships (pp. 313—
335). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Feeney, J. A., & J. Fitzgerald. (2012). Relationship Education. In P. Noller and G. Karantzas 
(Eds.) The Wiley-Blackwell handbook of couples and family relationships, (pp. 289—
304). West Sussex, UK: Blackwell Publishing. 
Fiske, A. (1991). Structures of social life: the four elementary forms of human relations. 
New York: Free Press. 
Fitness, J. (2001). Betrayal, rejection, revenge, and forgiveness: An interpersonal script 
approach. In M. R. Leary (Ed.), Interpersonal Rejection (pp. 73—103). New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Fitness, J., & Warburton, W. (2009). Thinking the Unthinkable: Cognitive Appraisals and 
Hurt Feelings. In A. Vangelisti (Ed.), Feeling Hurt in Close Relationships (pp. 34—
49). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Chapter 2 – The Experience of Hurt 45 
Gillath, O., Karantzas, G. C., & Fraley, R. C. (2016). Adult attachment: A concise 
introduction to theory and research. London: Academic Press. 
Gottman, J.M. (1999). The marriage clinic: A scientifically based marital therapy. USA: 
W.W.Norton & Co.  
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 10(3), 252—264.  
Haslam, N., & Loughnan, S. (2014). Dehumanization and infrahumanization. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 65, 399—423. 
Haslam, N., Loughnan, S., & Holland, E. (2013). The psychology of humanness. In S. J. 
Gervais (Eds.), Objectification and (de)humanization: 60th Nebraska symposium on 
motivation (pp 25—51). New York, NY: Springer Science and Business Media. 
Haslam, N., Loughnan, S., Reynolds, C., & Wilson, S. (2007). Dehumanization: A new 
perspective. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 1(1), 409—422. 
Haslam, N., & Stratemeyer, M. (2016). Recent research on dehumanization. Current 
Opinion in Psychology, 11, 25—29. 
Hazan, C., & Shaver, P. (1987). Romantic love conceptualized as an attachment 
process. Journal of personality and social psychology, 52(3), 511. 
Haque, O. S., & Waytz, A. (2012). Dehumanization in medicine: Causes, solutions, and 
functions. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 176—186. 
Heavey, C. L., Layne, C., & Christensen, A. (1993). Gender and conflict structure in marital 
interaction: A replication and extension. Journal of Consulting and Clinical 
Psychology, 61, 16—27.  
Iida, M., Seidman, G., Shrout, P. E., Fujita, K., & Bolger, N. (2008). Modeling support 
provision in intimate relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 
460—478. 
Chapter 2 – The Experience of Hurt 46 
Karantzas, G. C. (2017). In J. Fitzgerald (Ed.), Caregiving in Couple Relationships. 
Foundations for Couples' Therapy: Research for the Real World (pp. 31—40). New 
York: Routledge. 
Karantzas, G. C., Haslam, N., Simpson, J., & Pizzirani, B. (2018). Interpersonal 
dehumanization: An attachment theory perspective. In preparation. 
Kelman, H. (1976). Violence without restraint: Reflections on the dehumanization of victims 
and victimizers. In G. Kren & L. Rappoport (Eds.), Varieties of Psychohistory (pp. 
282—314). New York: Springer. 
Kunce, L., & Shaver, P. (1994). An attachment-theoretical approach to caregiving in romantic 
relationships. Advances in Personal relationships, 5, 205 —237. 
Leary, M., & Leder, S. (2009). The Nature of Hurt Feelings: Emotional Experience and 
Cognitive Appraisals. In A. Vangelisti (Ed.), Feeling Hurt in Close Relationships (pp. 
15—33). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Leary, M. R., & Springer, C. (2001). Hurt feelings: The neglected emotion. In R. M. 
Kowalski (Ed.), Behaving badly: Aversive behaviors in interpersonal relationships 
(pp. 151—175). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. 
Leary, M. R., Springer, C., Negel, L., Ansell, E., & Evans, K. (1998). The causes, 
phenomenology, and consequences of hurt feelings. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 74, 1225—1237. 
Leyens, J-P., Cortes, B., Demoulin, S., Dovidio, J., Fiske, S., & Gaunt, R. (2003). Emotional 
prejudice, essentialism, and nationalism: the 2002 Tajfel lecture. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 33, 703—17. 
Leyens, J-P., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S., Rodriguez-Perez, A., & Gaunt, R. 
(2000). The emotional side of prejudice: The attribution of secondary emotions to 
ingroups and outgroups. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 4, 186—197. 
Chapter 2 – The Experience of Hurt 47 
Leyens J-P., Rodriguez‐Torres, R., Rodriguez‐Perez, A., Gaunt, R., Paladino, M., et al. (2001). 
Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions 
to ingroups and outgroups. European Journal of Social Psychology, 81, 395—411. 
MacDonald, G. (2009). Social pain and hurt feelings. In P. J. Corr and G. Matthews (Eds.) 
Cambridge handbook of personality psychology, (pp. 541—555). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Matsumoto, D., Hwang, H. C., & Frank, M. G. (2016). The effects of incidental anger, 
contempt, and disgust on hostile language and implicit behaviors. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 46, 437—452. 
Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2007). Attachment in adulthood: Structure, dynamics, and 
change. New York: Guilford Press. 
Noller, P. (2012). Conflict in family relationships. In P. Noller and G. Karantzas (Eds.) The 
Wiley-Blackwell handbook of couples and family relationships, (pp. 129—143). West 
Sussex, UK: Blackwell Publishing.  
Opotow, S. (1990). Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction. Journal of Social Issues 
and Policy Review, 46, 1—20. 
Ruehlman, L. S., & Karoly, P. (1991). With a little flak from my friends: Development and 
preliminary validation of the Test of Negative Social Exchange (TENSE). 
Psychological Assessment: A Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 3(1), 
97—104. 
Schrodt, P., Witt, P. L., & Shimkowski, J. R. (2014). A meta-analytical review of the 
demand/withdraw pattern of interaction and its associations with individual, 
relational, and communicative outcomes. Communication Monographs, 81, 28—58.  
Shaver, P. R., & Mikulincer, M. (2002). Attachment-related psychodynamics. Attachment 
and Human Development, 4(2), 133—161. 
Chapter 2 – The Experience of Hurt 48 
Shaver, P. R., Mikulincer, M., Lavy, S., & Cassidy, J. (2009). Understanding and altering 
hurt feelings: An attachment-theoretical perspective on the generation and regulation of 
emotions. In A. Vangelisti (Ed.), Feeling Hurt in Close Relationships (pp. 92—119). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, T. W. (1994). Concepts and methods in the study of anger, hostility, and health. In A. 
W. Siegman and T. W. Smith (Eds.) Anger, hostility, and the heart (pp. 23—42). New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Staub, E. (1989). The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Steele, C., Kidd, D. C., & Castano, E. (2015). On social death: Ostracism and the 
accessibility of death thoughts. Death studies, 39(1), 19—23. 
Vangelisti, A. L. (2001). Making sense of hurtful interactions in close relationships. In V. 
Manusov & J. H. Harvey (Eds.), Attribution, communication behavior, and close 
relationships (pp. 38—58). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Vangelisti, A. (2009). Hurt Feelings: Distinguishing Features, Functions, and Overview. In 
A. Vangelisti (Ed.), Feeling Hurt in Close Relationships (pp. 3—12). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Vangelisti, A. L., Young, S. L., Carpenter, K., & Alexander, A. L. (2005). Why does it hurt? 
The perceived causes of hurt feelings. Communication Research, 32, 443—477.  
Williams, K. D. (2007). Ostracism: The kiss of social death. Social and Personality 
Psychology Compass, 1(1), 236—247. 
  
Chapter 2 – The Experience of Hurt 49 
Chapter 2 Conclusion 
This chapter included Paper 1 of this dissertation. The paper put forward a conceptual 
model suggesting that the underlying cause of hurt in interpersonal relationships encompasses 
the denial of humanness. Specifically, the experience of hurt is underpinned—or defined 
by—dehumanization in which the target is likened to an animal or machine (or both) via the 
denial of uniquely or fundamental human qualities. Thus, not all negative interpersonal 
interactions or experiences are hurtful. It is only those experiences in which a person is the 
target of the negative behavior that denies their sense of humanness (i.e., dehumanization) in 
which hurt should ensue. Similarly, seemingly positive experiences (e.g., undermining and 
interfering social support) can also be hurtful because they too are dehumanizing.  
In addition, Paper 1 provides the first detailed account of how dehumanization may 
manifest in close and intimate relationships; highlighting how the phenomenon may be 
associated with a wide range of relationship experiences and processes (some of which 
include the maltreatment of another [e.g., undermining and interfering social support, 
hostility [aggression], and conditional regard). However, given that Paper 1 reflects a 
theoretical analysis of interpersonal dehumanization, empirical evidence is required to 
confirm the proposed associations between dehumanization and the hurtful relationship 
behaviors and maltreatments outlined in Paper 1. Yet, no measure exists to assess 
dehumanization within intimate or close personal contexts. Therefore, in the next chapter, 
Paper 2 is presented, which reports on the development and psychometric evaluation of a new 
measure of dehumanization in romantic relationships.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF A 
DEHUMANIZATION MEASURE WITHIN ROMANTIC RELATIONSHIPS 
There is an increasing interest into the study of interpersonal dehumanization. This 
interest is largely the result of the continued utility of dehumanization as a predictor (and 
theorized mechanism) of both intergroup and interpersonal processes and outcomes studied 
within social psychology more generally (Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016). Paper 1 further 
illustrated the utility of the concept of dehumanization within close relationships—both as an 
underlying cause of hurtful experiences as well as a way to understand various negative 
relationship behaviors and maltreatments.  
Despite the interest into the study of dehumanization within intimate relationships, 
there are inherent barriers that have limited the study of the phenomenon within this context. 
Firstly, no measure exists to assess target and perpetrator perspectives of dehumanization. 
Without such a measure, it is difficult to investigate the proposed associations between 
dehumanization and various relationship processes and outcomes. Secondly, there exists 
some conceptual ambiguity regarding the dimensionality of dehumanization. For instance, 
some research has demonstrated that dehumanization is best represented as a unitary 
construct (Bastian, Haslam & Jetten, 2014), while others consider dehumanization to be more 
nuanced comprising multiple dimensions (Bastian & Haslam, 2010, 2011; Haslam, 2006).  
As a way to address these two limitations, Paper 2 (reported in this chapter) described the 
development and psychometric evaluation of a self-report measure of dehumanization within 
intimate relationships that assesses the phenomenon from both target and perpetrator 
perspectives.  
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Abstract 
Despite the emergence of research into interpersonal dehumanization, there has been little by 
way of empirical investigation of the phenomenon within the context of romantic 
relationships. To address this, we introduce and validate the Dehumanization in Romantic 
Relationships Scale (DIRRS), a self-report measure of dehumanization perpetration and 
targeting within intimate relationships. In Study 1 (N=1251, M age=25.35, SD=6.03), 
confirmatory factor analysis revealed that the dimensionality of interpersonal dehumanization 
may be more nuanced than first thought. Specifically, a four factor first-order structure 
(comprised of factors that relate to denials of human uniqueness [i.e., immaturity/competence 
and social refinement] and human nature [i.e., conditional regard and dissociation] was found 
to be the best fit to the data. These results were replicated on a different sample in Study 2 
(N=847, M age=3.55 years, SD=4.27)—in addition to the assessment of criterion-related 
validity. Study 3 (N=328, M age=2.40 years, SD=4.27) cross-validated the criterion-related 
validity reported in Study 2, and in addition, highlights that dehumanization is also associated 
with emotional and physical abuse. This research extends theory on interpersonal 
dehumanization and provides an empirically validated measure to reliably assess the 
occurrence of dehumanization within romantic relationships.  
 
Keywords: Dehumanization; interpersonal relationships; confirmatory factor analysis; 
measurement; abuse; maltreatment. 
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The Development and Validation of a Dehumanization  
Measure Within Romantic Relationships 
Dehumanization—defined as the denial of uniquely or fundamentally human characteristics 
to another—is considered to occur across a range of contexts including moral atrocities 
related to ethnic cleansing, inter-racial conflicts, as well as medical and organizational 
settings (Bain, Vaes & Leyens, 2014; Haslman & Stratemeyer, 2016). However, theoretical 
advancements over the past decade, suggest that dehumanization is not limited to intergroup 
conflicts or blatant acts of atrocity. Rather, dehumanization can take the form of implicit and 
commonplace behaviors that manifest within interpersonal contexts, but nonetheless, damage 
relational bonds (e.g., social ostracism and contempt; Bastian & Haslam, 2011; Bastian, 
Haslam & Jetten, 2014).  
Despite the emergence of research into interpersonal dehumanization, there has been 
little by way of empirical investigation of dehumanization within the context of romantic 
relationships. Nevertheless, many of the behaviors identified as negative and toxic within 
romantic relationships such as hostility, ridicule, and being controlling reflect 
dehumanization (Pizzirani & Karantzas, 2018). Specifically, such behaviors deny the target 
(i.e., the romantic partner) their sense of agency, as if they have no feelings, or lack 
intelligence (Bastian & Haslam, 2011). Moreover, interpersonal dehumanization within close 
relationships is often characteristic of common and subtle maltreatments, such as feigning 
disinterest, acting in ways that may disrespect another, or minor exploitative acts such as 
requesting favors that see another treated as a means to an end (Bastian et al., 2014). For 
example, being socially ostracized or treated instrumentally (i.e., as if one’s value is based 
solely on what they have to offer another) by a friend.   
Through a series of studies, Bastian and Haslam (2011) found that targets of a range 
of common maltreatments experienced dehumanization. Such work demonstrates that the 
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actions of close others—such as romantic partners—play an important hand in people’s 
experiences of dehumanization. Furthermore, acts of dehumanization within intimate 
contexts are likely to disrupt the positive functions of romantic relationships, which include 
the provision of support to encourage competence and personal growth within a partner 
(Feeney & Collins, 2014), and to meet a partner’s fundamental needs for comfort and 
security (Feeney, 2009).  
Given the increasing interest in interpersonal dehumanization, it is surprising that 
there is little by way of dehumanization research within the context of intimate relationships. 
We argue that this dearth in research is for two reasons. Firstly, there exists no target or 
perpetrator assessment of dehumanization within romantic relationships. This is despite 
findings that demonstrate interpersonal dehumanization is most often perpetrated by people 
within one’s close social network, which includes romantic partners (Adams, 2014). 
Secondly, conceptual ambiguity surrounds the dimensionality of interpersonal 
dehumanization (and dehumanization more generally). For example, some research suggests 
that interpersonal dehumanization is best conceptualized as a two-dimensional construct (i.e., 
the denial of human nature and the denial of human uniqueness; Bastian & Haslam, 2010, 
2011), while other studies suggest that interpersonal dehumanization may be unidimensional 
(Bastian et al., 2012a; Bastian, Jetten, Radke, 2012b; Bastian et al., 2014). To address these 
limitations, we report on three studies in which we developed and validated a measure to 
assess dehumanization (from both target and perpetrator perspectives) within romantic 
relationships, as well as determine the dimensional structure of the construct.  
Dehumanization is described as treating or perceiving an individual or group as lacking 
human attributes that separate humans from non-human entities, such as animals or inanimate 
objects (Bain et al., 2014). Traditionally, dehumanization was viewed as an extreme 
phenomenon that took place within the contexts of mass violence (i.e., mass shootings), 
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intense conflict (i.e., the Syrian War, Kelman, 1976;) and moral atrocities (i.e., the genocide 
against the Tutsi in Rawanda, Bandura, 1999;). However, since this early work, 
dehumanization has been acknowledged to be a commonly experienced phenomenon within 
interpersonal contexts (such as couple, family, and peer relationships) that can include subtle 
(e.g., Leyens et al., 2000) and seemingly innocuous maltreatments such as being treated with 
condescension, contempt, or anger (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2011).  
Up until the last decade, dehumanization was described as a unidimensional construct 
such that it reflected denying individuals the human qualities that separate them from animals 
(e.g., Leyens et al., 2000). In an attempt to provide a more comprehensive conceptualization 
of dehumanization, Haslam (2006) proposed a model of dehumanization comprising of two-
dimensions. According to Haslam, dehumanization can entail behaviors beyond likening an 
individual or group to an animal. Haslam proposed that people also tend to engage in 
dehumanization that likens an individual or group to inanimate objects, such as machines and 
robots. To this end, these two distinct denials of humanness yield two-dimensions of 
dehumanization.  
According to this two-dimensional perspective (Haslam, 2006), dehumanization can 
involve the denial of uniquely human characteristics and characteristics reflective of human 
nature. When denied uniquely human qualities (also referred to as ‘animalistic’ 
dehumanization), people are likened to animals and seen as primitive, inferior, irrational, 
childlike or unintelligent. Specifically, people are denied attributes such as self-control, 
civility, competency, social refinement, agency (i.e., the ability to plan and think for oneself) 
and maturity (Haslam, Loughnan & Holland, 2013). When denied human nature qualities 
(also referred to as ‘mechanistic’ dehumanization), people are likened to objects and 
machines and seen as superficial, cold, or lacking emotion (Bastian & Haslam, 2011; Haslam 
et al., 2013). This form of dehumanization involves denying people attributes such as 
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emotionality, cognitive flexibility, curiosity, and interpersonal warmth (Haslam et al., 2013).
 The two-dimensional conceptualization of dehumanization (Haslam, 2006) has 
received considerable support from a number of studies (for review see Haslam, 2015). 
However, recent research again suggests a unidimensional conceptualization of 
dehumanization may be more appropriate within interpersonal contexts. For example, across 
four studies Bastian et al. (2012a) identified a unidimensional factor solution for 
dehumanization1 (as opposed to a two-factor solution), suggesting that the denial of human 
nature and human uniqueness may be subsumed under a single dimension. Thus, although a 
number of studies support the distinction between human uniqueness and human nature (see 
Haslam, 2015), recent research has brought this conceptualization into question, especially 
within the interpersonal context (e.g., Bastian et al., 2012b).  
The issues regarding the dimensionality of interpersonal dehumanization may, in part, 
be a function of the history of the measurement of dehumanization (which has stemmed 
largely from intergroup research of the phenomenon). Specifically, assessment has largely 
involved either single item measures or multi-item perceptions of humanness traits. Single 
item measures, for instance, assess a particular group’s evolutionary progress on a question 
depicting the ascent of man (Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). However, this 
measure only assesses animalistic dehumanization (e.g., perceiving others as ‘savage’ and 
‘barbaric’) and not the denial of human nature.  
Self-report perceptions of humanness involve rating a set of personality-like 
characteristics as reflecting either human uniqueness or human nature (e.g., Haslam, Bain, 
Douge, Lee & Bastian, 2005; Loughnan & Haslam, 2006). Derivatives of these measures 
assess the extent to which these traits are perceived within the self, and/or ascribed to others 
                                                 
1Bastian and colleagues focused on the self-dehumanizing consequences of social ostracism 
and in doing so directly measured participants’ perceptions of their self-humanity after a 
dehumanizing experience.  
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(e.g., Bain, Park, Kwok & Haslam, 2009; Bastian et al., 2012b). Other self-report measures 
assess perceptions of having experienced dehumanization (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2010, 
2011). However, while these measures have been used to explicitly assess denials of human 
uniqueness and human nature, recent findings suggest either two semi-independent factors or 
two highly correlated factors with researchers collapsing across these dimensions to yield a 
single dehumanization factor (see Bastian et al., 2012a, 2012b). In addition, these measures 
suffer from three further limitations when assessing dehumanization within the context of 
close relationships. 
Firstly, the vast majority of existing self-report assessments focus on ascribing or 
evaluating human characteristics rather than explicitly measuring behaviors that reflect 
dehumanization—that is—the actual treatment of someone as less than human. Within close 
relationships, the interpersonal processes that govern relationship functioning often entail a 
behavioral component (e.g., conflict patterns [Eldridge & Christensen, 2002], the provision 
of social support [Feeney & Collins, 2014], and the demonstration of intimacy [Laurenceau, 
Barrett, & Pietromonaco, 1998]). To this end, it would be remiss of dehumanization 
assessments to not capture behavioral manifestations of the construct in close relationships.  
Secondly, measures to date (largely because of the field’s focus on the intergroup 
context) reflect dehumanization attitudes or perceptions towards people or groups in general. 
However, within the context of close relationships, the fidelity of assessment can be higher 
and the predictive validity of the measure greater, when the assessment focuses on a specific 
individual (e.g., romantic partner, peer, or parent; Fraley, Heffernan, Vicary, & Brumbaugh, 
2011).  
Finally, studies into dehumanization tend to focus, and therefore assess, perceptions 
or attitudes regarding being either the perpetrator of dehumanization or the target of 
dehumanization, but not both (e.g., Haslam et al., 2005; Kteily et al., 2015). Nevertheless, 
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within an interpersonal context such as romantic relationships, dehumanization should be 
considered dyadic in nature. In this way a person’s experiences of dehumanization will entail 
either treating one’s partner as less than human (i.e., perpetration) and/or being the target of 
dehumanization enacted by one’s partner. Hence, a comprehensive measurement of the 
construct within the context of intimate relationships should involve the assessment of 
dehumanization from both perspectives.  
In light of these limitations, it is necessary to develop a psychometrically sound 
measure of romantic relationship dehumanization. Moreover, the development of such a 
measure can help relationship scholars better understand the role of dehumanization in the 
manifestation of aversive relationship behaviors (e.g., cycles of violence [Bastian et al., 2014] 
or intimate partner aggression). 
The primary aim of this paper is to develop and psychometrically assess (i.e., 
construct validity and criterion-related validity) a measure of romantic relationship 
dehumanization that captures both perpetrator and target perspectives. The secondary aim is 
to determine the dimensionality of dehumanization within romantic relationships by 
comparing the two most common conceptualizations of interpersonal dehumanization 
proposed within the literature—the unidimensional structure (as reported by Bastian et al., 
2012a & Bastian et al., 2012b) and the two-dimensional structure (reflecting Haslam’s [2006] 
dual model of dehumanization).  
The development and psychometric evaluation of this new measure, titled the 
‘Dehumanization in Romantic Relationships Scale’ (DIRRS), is reported across three 
Studies. Study 1 reports on the initial development and construct validity of the DIRRS and 
includes a comparison of the proposed unidimensional and two-dimensional structures. Study 
2 reports on a cross-validation of the DIRRS and extends the psychometric evaluation to 
criterion-related validity (i.e., concurrent validity). Specifically, a series of measures 
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pertaining to relationship functioning such as relationship quality, patterns of communication 
and negative interactions, providing care for one’s partner, and maintaining positive partner 
regard are used to determine concurrent validity. Study 3 attempts to replicate the criterion-
related validity findings of Study 2 but extends on this to explore the associations between 
dehumanization and overt emotional and physical abuse within romantic relationships. 
Study 1 
Study 1 reports on the development of the DIRRS and the psychometric evaluation of 
the measure (i.e., construct validation), thus identifying the optimal factor structure and 
determining the internal consistency (i.e., reliability) of the scales that constitute the DIRRS. 
Given the construct of interpersonal dehumanization has been articulated to constitute either 
a single dimension or two-dimensions it was important to: (1) develop an item pool that 
captured the full breadth of the construct across these differing conceptualizations, and, (2) 
statistically model and compare the unidimensional and two-dimensional conceptualizations 
of interpersonal dehumanization. 
Overview of Item Pool Development  
The development of the DIRRS involved deriving items that captured the definitional 
properties of both the unidimensional and two-dimensional conceptualizations of 
interpersonal dehumanization, as well as the full range of hurtful relationship behaviors 
suggested in the literature to represent interpersonal denials of humanness (for review see 
Pizzirani & Karantzas, 2018). A literature search was also conducted to identify past 
measures within the general field of dehumanization research.  
Using the definitional features of human uniqueness (i.e., intelligence, self-control, 
civility, competency, social refinement, and maturity) and human nature (i.e., the ability to 
experience and express emotions, cognitive flexibility, and interpersonal warmth), the 
relational denials of humanness identified by Pizzirani and Karantzas (2018), and drawing on 
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Bastian and Haslam’s (2011) measure of dehumanization2, an initial pool of 30 items were 
developed that could be equally framed to capture both perpetrator and target perspectives of 
romantic dehumanization.  
Modelling the Dimensional Structure of Romantic Relationship Dehumanization 
The construct validation approach for Study 1 involved the apriori modelling and 
comparison of two factor structures. The first of these factor structures (Figure 1, Model 1) 
depicted dehumanization as a unidimensional construct, such that all items were modelled to 
load onto a global dehumanization factor. This factor structure draws on recent empirical 
evidence (as well as early theorizing on the concept of dehumanization) to suggest that the 
construct is best represented as unitary in nature (e.g., Bastian et al., 2012a, 2012b, 2014). 
The second factor structure (Figure 1, Model 2) depicted dehumanization as a two-
dimensional construct constituting the denial of human uniqueness and the denial of human 
nature. This factor structure represents Haslam’s (2006) dual model of dehumanization. 
Given the suggestion that interpersonal dehumanization may reflect quite nuanced 
manifestations of dehumanization (e.g., Pizzirani & Karantzas, 2018) we predicted that 
modelling the two-dimensional conceptualization on the DIRRS would provide better fit to 
the data than the unidimensional conceptualization. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 1251 participants (39.2% men, 60.1% women, .6% gender 
not specified) recruited online from social networking sites and online forums (e.g., Facebook 
and Reddit). The sample consisted of participants from the United States (54.8%), Canada 
                                                 
2 After reading a vignette in which they were the target of a particular maltreatment, 
participants were required to rate the extent to which the perpetrator viewed them as fully 
human (e.g., “the other person doesn’t see me as an individual”). 
 
Chapter 3 – Measuring Interpersonal Dehumanization 63 
(10.6%), Australia (8.6%), and the United Kingdom (8.2%). Participants ranged in age from 
18 to 63 years (M=25.35, SD=6.03) and were all in a current romantic relationship (M 
relationship length=3.33 years, SD=3.83). Relationship status of the sample comprised of 
individuals who were steadily dating (49.9%), cohabiting (25.7%), engaged (8.1%), and 
married (17.4%).  
Materials and procedure 
The DIRRS is presented in Appendix A. An initial pool of 30 items was created and 
items were framed to capture both perpetrator and target perspectives of romantic 
relationship dehumanization. Two experts then independently reviewed and rated the face-
validity of all 30 items. A face-validity approach was used to ensure that the generated items 
were judged to appropriately assess the intended construct (e.g., Hardesty & Bearden, 2004; 
Murphy & Davidshofer, 1988; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) and to limit the exclusive 
reliance on empirical data reduction approaches such as Exploratory Factor Analysis.  
The face-validation of items was based on three criteria. These were the extent to 
which each item: 1) captured the unidimensional and two-dimensional conceptualizations of 
dehumanization, 2) reflected dehumanization within romantic relationships, and 3) applied to 
both perpetrator and target perspectives of dehumanization. The two experts were also 
instructed to limit the measure’s length to ensure that it could be completed in a timely 
manner. To guide the number of items to be selected, the independent reviewers were asked 
to select up to six items reflective of the denial of human uniqueness and human nature. The 
decision to limit the item selection in this way was on the basis of Classical Test Theory and 
latent variable modelling approaches to measurement development (e.g., Brown, 2015; 
Harvey, Billings, & Nilan, 1985; Hinkin, 1995, 1998; Marsh, Hau, Balla, & Grayson, 1998).   
The two independent reviewers demonstrated high agreement (Cohen’s Kappa = 
91.2%) across the selection of 12 items from the original item pool. These 12 items were 
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categorized by both independent raters to reflect either the denial of human uniqueness (6 
items) or the denial of human nature (6 items). Of the final 12 items selected by the expert 
judges, three were items were retained from the Bastian and Haslam (2011) dehumanization 
measure, while nine reflected original items (See Appendix A). As shown in Appendix A, 
each item is worded in two forms to reflect assessment of both perpetrator and target 
perspectives. Thus, participants are required to rate the same 12 items twice – once to assess 
their tendency to perpetrate dehumanization, and once to assess their tendency to be the target 
of dehumanization. Each item is rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher scores reflect greater dehumanization perpetration or 
targeting.  
Participants were administered the DIRRS by way of an anonymous online survey 
that also included a demographics questionnaire that entailed sex, age, ethnicity, relationship 
length and relationship status. The online survey took approximately 10 minutes. 
Data Analysis 
The construct validity of the DIRRS was assessed using Confirmatory Factor 
Analyses (CFA) with Maximum Likelihood Estimation (Muthén & Kaplan, 1985). 
Assessment of model fit was based on the guidelines proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999). 
Therefore, in addition to evaluating the chi-square value (2ML), a model with a Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) ≥.95, Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) ≤.05, and Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR)=.06 was 
indicative of good fit. Given that the secondary aim of this research was to determine the 
dimensional composition of interpersonal dehumanization, CFA was used to model two 
alternative factor structures – Model 1 evaluated the unidimensional conceptualization of 
dehumanization, while Model 2 evaluated the two-dimensional conceptualization. Because 
the newly developed measure included items that assessed dehumanization from both the 
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perpetrator and target perspectives, separate CFAs were conducted for each set of items. In 
order to determine the best fitting structure between the two alternative models (i.e., 
unidimensional and two-dimensional structures) chi-square difference (2) tests of model fit 
were conducted. To safeguard against Type II error when identifying significant differences 
between models, a practical difference test (i.e., a TLI difference of .01) was employed. 
Results and Discussion 
The unidimensional structure of dehumanization (see Figure 1, Model 1) 
demonstrated poor fit for both perpetration and target versions of the DIRRS (see Table 1). 
The two-dimensional structure (see Figure 1, Model 2) also demonstrated poor fit for the 
items constituting the perpetration of dehumanization and being the target of dehumanization 
(see Table 1). Factor loadings for all items (perpetration and target) across the two alternative 
models (i.e., Model 1 and 2) varied in magnitude from =.45 to =.78 (see Figure 1) and 
were all significant at p<.001. As presented in Table 1, comparison of the fit of perpetration 
and target items across Models 1 and 2 by way of chi-square differences tests revealed that 
the two-dimensional model was of significantly better fit to data for both sets of items 
compared to the unidimensional model.  
However, despite the significantly better fit of the two-dimensional model, the overall 
poor fit of this factor structure indicates model misspecification (e.g., Brown, 2015). In 
particular, a poor fitting factor structure can often signal that item variance needs to be 
accounted for through the modelling of additional factors (e.g., Brown, 2015; Kline, 2015). 
To this end, we endeavored to derive a post-hoc multifactorial structure that would: (1) better 
account for item variance, and (2) advance on prior theory regarding the dimensionality of 
dehumanization.  
Post-hoc re-examination of the items for human uniqueness and human nature 
suggested that each subscale of the DIRRS may in fact contain subthemes suggestive of a 
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four factor solution for the perpetrator and target items respectively. While a four factor 
conceptualization of dehumanization is indeed novel, a closer inspection of the literature 
indicates an implicit set of facets pertaining to human uniqueness and human nature that are 
related, but somewhat distinct. Specifically, these facets can be found within the vast 
majority of contemporary definitions of human nature and human uniqueness (e.g., Bastian & 
Haslam, 2011; Haslam, 2006, 2015; Haslam et al., 2013). For example, the denial of human 
uniqueness is described as perceiving the target as coarse and backward (i.e., lacking social 
refinement), or irrational, childlike and immature (i.e., lacking maturity and competence). 
The denial of human nature is often described as seeing the target as an object or machine 
(i.e., a means to an end) or as cold, inert, and lacking emotion (i.e., heartless). 
Therefore, the denial of human uniqueness may reflect two subfactors with items (3 
per factor) constituting immaturity/competence and social refinement. The 
immaturity/competence factor represents the treatment of an individual as if they are a child 
and can’t manage on one’s own, whereas the social refinement factor suggests that an 
individual is an embarrassment to one’s partner, and that one’s partner is ashamed of an 
individual’s lack of social status. Likewise, the denial of human nature also reflects two 
subfactors (3 items per factor), namely, conditional regard and dissociation. The conditional 
regard factor represents being treated as a means to an end in which one’s worth is based on 
what they can offer another (i.e., machine or robot-like), whereas the dissociation factor 
suggests that one is heartless and unresponsive (i.e., lacking emotion). 
To determine the fit of this multifactorial structure, a four factor first-order structure 
with oblique rotation was evaluated (see Figure 2, Model 3). However, given that Model 3 
reflected a multifactorial structure that was derived on the basis of items thought to capture 
the unidimensional and two-dimensional conceptualizations of dehumanization, two 
additional higher-order models were tested. Specifically, Model 4 (see Figure 2) represents a 
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two factor higher-order model with four first-order factors. The two higher-order factors 
represent the dual model of dehumanization. Model 5 (see Figure 2) represents a single factor 
higher-order model with four first-order factors. The higher-order factor represents the 
unidimensional conceptualization of interpersonal dehumanization. That is, both higher-order 
models assume that the existing conceptualizations of dehumanization reported in the 
literature may reflect higher-order or global structures that are underpinned by more nuanced 
and specific lower-order facets. As in the case of Models 1 and 2, Models 3 to 5 were 
evaluated for model fit and comparison across models was conducted using chi-square 
difference tests. 
The four factor first-order structure of dehumanization (Figure 2, Model 3) resulted in 
very good fit for both perpetration and target items (see Table 1). The two-dimensional 
higher order structure (Figure 2, Model 4) demonstrated good to very good fit for both 
perpetration and target items (see Table 1). The unidimensional higher-order structure 
(Figure 2, Model 5) also resulted in good to very good fit for both perpetration and target 
items (see Table 1). Across Models 3 to 5, the scale items demonstrated moderate to high 
loadings onto their respective factors (=.58–.89, see Figure 2) and all loadings were 
significant (p<.001) 
Chi-square difference tests comparing the fit between Models 3 through 5 with Model 
2 (the best fitting model out of Models 1 and 2) were conducted across perpetration and 
target items. In relation to items assessing perpetration, Model 3 (i.e., the four factor first-
order solution) demonstrated significantly better fit when compared to all other models (see 
Table 1). In relation to items assessing being the target of dehumanization, Models 3 through 
5 were of significantly better fit compared with Model 2, however, the differences between 
Models 3, 4, and 5 (2 and TLI) were not significant. That is, Models 3 to 5 were 
equivalent in terms of fit (see Table 1). 
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In summary, model comparisons revealed that the four factor first-order solution 
(Model 3) was the best fit to the data in relation to the perpetration items. Model 3 comprised 
factors that relate to denials of human uniqueness (i.e., immaturity/competence and social 
refinement) and human nature (i.e., conditional regard and dissociation). The four factor first-
order model possesses good internal consistency across both perpetration 
(immaturity/competence α=.76; social refinement α=.75; conditional regard α=.71; 
dissociation α=.83) and target (immaturity/competence α=.76; social refinement α=.78; 
conditional regard α=.76; dissociation α=.85) items. 
While the superior fit of Model 3 was apparent across all comparisons based on the 
perpetration items of the DIRRS, the findings were not as consistent for the target items. 
Specifically, Model 3 demonstrated significantly better fit than Models 1 and 2, however, 
was of equivalent fit when compared to Models 4 and 5 (i.e., the two factor and single factor 
higher-order models). While further confirmation of this new factor structure is required, 
what is apparent is that the dimensionality of the DIRRS (and interpersonal dehumanization 
more generally) may be more nuanced than first thought. That is, the two most common 
conceptualizations of dehumanization proposed within the literature—the unidimensional 
structure (as reported by Bastian et al., 2012a and Bastian et al., 2012b) and the two-
dimensional structure (reflecting Haslam’s [2006] dual model of dehumanization)—may not 
best reflect the nature of interpersonal dehumanization, especially within romantic 
relationships.   
Study 2 
The findings for the construct validation of the DIRRS in Study 1 resulted in a four 
factor first-order structure (i.e., Figure 2, Model 3) that had not been theorized apriori. 
Therefore, the central aim of Study 2 was to cross-validate this structure on an independent 
sample. In doing so, we again compared the fit of the four factor first-order structure to all 
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other dehumanization models tested as part of Study 1 (i.e., Models 1, 2 [Figure 1], 4, and 5 
[Figure 2]). We also extend our psychometric evaluation of the DIRRS to a criterion validity 
analysis for both versions (target and perpetration) of the measure.  
Given that dehumanization reflects people’s behavioral tendencies to treat another as 
less than human, it is highly probable that being the perpetrator and/or target of 
dehumanization is likely to be associated with a constellation of negative relationship 
behaviors and outcomes. For instance, dehumanization perpetration is characterized by 
treating someone as incompetent, stupid or as a means to end (Haslam, 2006), and is thus 
likely to be associated with engaging in other toxic and aversive relationship behaviors. 
These can include limiting a person’s agency and autonomy through controlling and intrusive 
behavior often manifested as caregiving or social support (e.g., Bolger & Amarel, 2007; 
Kunce & Shaver, 1994; Pizzirani & Karantzaz, 2018). Similarly, targets of romantic 
relationship dehumanization are likely to report being treated insensitively, suffering ridicule, 
and hostility. Therefore, targets may also engage in reactive or defensive behaviors in 
response their partner’s dehumanization, such as engaging in destructive communication 
patterns (e.g., stonewalling or withdrawing). 
Conversely, being either the perpetrator or target of dehumanization should attenuate 
people’s engagement in positive and constructive relationship behaviors while also lessening 
their positive appraisals of their partner and the relationship overall. For example, based on 
the perpetrator’s treatment of their romantic partner as less than human, we would expect the 
perpetrator to possess less positive regard for their partner as well as reductions in the 
perceived quality of their relationship. This is because the target is unlikely to be evaluated 
by the perpetrator as living up to what is expected of a partner (Fletcher, Simpson & Giles, 
1999). On the other hand, the target of dehumanization is also likely to view their partner and 
the relationship in a less positive light given that the behaviors that constitute dehumanization 
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are likely to undermine the positive functions of romantic relationships in which the 
perpetrator may also be viewed as falling well short of the target’s ideas of how they should 
be treated within their romantic relationship (Fletcher et al., 1999; Simpson, Fletcher & 
Campbell, 2001).  Therefore, the second aim of Study 2 was to determine the concurrent 
validity of the DIRRS using a series of measures pertaining to relationship functioning as 
well as partner and relationship appraisals. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 847 participants (37.9 % men, 61.4 % women, .7% gender 
not specified) recruited online via the same social networking platforms used in Study 1. 
Participants were from the United States (60%), Canada (12%), Australia (19%), and the 
United Kingdom (9%). Participants ranged in age from 18 to 59 years (M=25.55, SD=6.43) 
and were all in a current romantic relationship (M=3.55 years, SD=4.27). Relationship status 
consisted of participants who were steadily dating (51%), cohabiting (25%), engaged (8%), 
and married (16%).  
Materials and procedure 
Participants completed an anonymous online survey which took approximately 20 
minutes. The survey consisted of a series of demographic questions and self-report measures. 
These questions and measures are outlined below.  
Demographics. Included general questions concerning the participant’s age, gender, 
country of residence, and relationship status and length.  
Dehumanziation. Participants completed both the perpetration and target versions of 
DIIRS developed in Study 1 (see Study 1 for details).  
Relationship quality. Participants’ appraisal of their current romantic relationship was 
assessed using the Perceived Relationship Quality Components short form (PRQC-SF; 
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Fletcher, Simpson & Thomas, 2000). The PRQC-SF consists of 6 items that are rated on a 7-
point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely; α=.83).  
Negative social exchanges. Negative relationship behaviors experienced within 
romantic relationships were assessed using the Test of Negative Social Exchanges (TENSE; 
Ruehlman & Karoly, 1991). The TENSE consists of 24 items that are rated on a 9-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (frequently) where participants are asked to rate 
the frequency with which their relationship partner demonstrated negative behaviors. The 
TENSE is comprised of four subscales (6 items per dimension): Hostility, Insensitivity, 
Interference, and Ridicule (αs>.79). 
Positive regard. Positive appraisal of a romantic partner was assessed using a 
modified version of the Revised Barrett-Lennard Relationship Inventory (RBLR; Cramer, 
1986). The RBLR consists of 16-items that are rated on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (very 
untrue) to 6 (very true; α=.90). 
Communication Patterns. Constructive and destructive communication patterns were 
assessed using the Communication Patterns Questionnaire short form (CPQ-SF; Furtis, 
Campbell, Nielsen & Burwell, 2010) The measure consists of 11 items comprising two 
subscales: demand/withdrawal (destructive communication), and positive communication 
(constructive communication). Items are rated on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very 
unlikely) to 9 (very likely; αs>.72).  
Caregiving. To assess the tendencies by which individuals render care to their 
romantic partner, participants completed the Caregiving Questionnaire (Kunce & Shaver, 
1994). The Caregiving Questionnaire is a 32-item measure designed to assess 4 caregiving 
dimensions (8 items per dimension): proximity vs distance, sensitivity vs insensitivity, 
cooperation vs control, and compulsive caregiving. Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 6 (totally agree; αs>.79). 
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Results and Discussion 
Results are reported in two sections. In the first section, we report on the cross-
validation of the construct validity of the two versions of the DIIRS using CFA. Specifically, 
we compared the structure of the best-fitting model identified in Study 1 (the four factor first-
order model of dehumanization, Model 3 [Figure 2]) to all other factor structures illustrated 
across Models 1 to 5 (see Figures 1 and 2). After estimating model fit, we conducted a series 
of model difference tests in which Model 3 was tested against all other models. In the second 
section, we report on the analyses pertaining to the criterion-related validity of the measure 
by way of correlational analyses in which the dimensions of both versions of the DIIRS were 
examined for their associations with the criterion-related variables. 
Construct validity 
 The evaluation of the four factor first-order structure of dehumanization (Model 3) 
demonstrated excellent fit to the data for both the perpetration version of the DIRRS and 
target version of the DIRRS (see Table 2). Consistent with the findings from Study 1, chi-
square difference tests and TLI revealed that the four factor first-order structure was 
significantly better in fit when compared to all other models (2 and TLI pertain to Model 
3 compared against Models 1, 2, 4, and 5 respectively [see Figures 1 and 2]). This was the 
case across both the perpetration and target versions of the DIRRS (see Table 2).   
The findings regarding construct validity for Study 2, replicate the findings of Study 
1, such that the four factor first-order solution was the best fit to the data. Importantly, in 
Study 2, these findings were consistent for models testing items from both perpetrator and 
target perspectives. These findings again suggest that when it comes to interpersonal 
dehumanization—such as within romantic relationships—dehumanization may be more 
nuanced than first thought. This is not to say that the dual model (Haslam, 2006) or unitary 
conceptualizations of dehumanization are not relevant to the study of dehumanization within 
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romantic relationships. Rather, the one and two factor higher-order models reflect broad 
dimensions that are best distilled into more fine-grained facets within the context of romantic 
relationships. Importantly, these related but distinct facets capture a number of primary 
themes that are often implicitly discussed in reference to human uniqueness and human 
nature, but not readily identified as part of the one or two factor approaches. 
With reference to the four factor first-order structure of the DIRRS, while the 
subfactors of immaturity/competence and social refinement both reflect denials of human 
uniqueness, they are also conceptually distinct. For example, an individual may perceive their 
partner to be highly competent, but nonetheless lack a degree of social refinement. Likewise, 
although conditional regard and dissociation reflect denials of human nature, treating 
someone with conditional regard is not synonymous with treating someone as if they are 
heartless or unable to experience or express interpersonal warmth (i.e., dissociation). With 
conditional regard, an individual can possess interpersonal warmth while at the same time be 
treated as if they are only valuable for what they can offer. In contrast, dissociation reflects a 
constant state of emotional inertia (i.e., heartless and cold). 
Criterion validity 
Based on the results of the construct validity analyses, we evaluated the criterion-
related validity of the four factor first-order structure of the perpetrator and target versions of 
the DIRRS. Specifically, the associations between the four factors of immaturity/competence, 
social refinement, conditional regard, and dissociation, and variables representing positive 
and negative relationship interactions as well as relationship and partner evaluations were 
tested.  
The descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between the four factors of the 
DIRRS (for both perpetration and target versions) and the criterion-related validity variables 
are listed in Tables 3 and 4. In line with predictions, for both versions of the DIRRS, the four 
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subscales were found to positively correlate with the use of demand-withdrawal 
communication (i.e., destructive conflict management) and negatively with positive 
communication (i.e., constructive conflict management). Similarly, across both versions of 
the measure, all four subscales were negatively associated with reports of relationship quality 
and regard for one’s partner (see Tables 3 and 4). Additionally, moderate associations were 
found between all subscales of the target version of the DIRRS and scores on negative 
relationship experiences as indexed by the TENSE subscales of hostility, insensitivity, 
interference, and ridicule (see Table 3). Finally, and in line with our predictions, all subscales 
of the perpetration version of the DIRRS were positively associated with providing care that 
is compulsive and intrusive, and negatively associated with care that is sensitive, proximal, 
and cooperative (see Table 4). 
In summary, being the target or perpetrator of dehumanization has implications for 
the way romantic partners treat one another and their appraisals of their partner and 
relationship. A consistent pattern of negative associations with positive relationship 
behaviors, and positive associations with negative relationship behaviors was found between 
all dehumanization subscales (for both target and perpetration versions of the DIRRS). In 
short, both versions of the DIRRS and their respective factors were associated with criterion-
related variables in ways that were in line with our predictions.  
Study 3 
Study 3 had two aims. First, to cross-validate the associations between 
dehumanization and the criterion-validity variables reported in Study 2. Second, to 
investigate the associations between dehumanization and the very extreme end of the 
negative relationship behavior spectrum—overt emotional and physical abuse.  
The application of dehumanization to the study of more severe romantic relationship 
behavior stems from the long-held view that perpetrators of dehumanization are less likely to 
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experience empathic distress or guilt for an abhorrent or violent act and are less likely to 
condemn oneself for such an act (e.g., Bandura, 1999; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Kelman, 
1976; Kteily & Bruneau, 2017). Because the perpetrator perceives the target of 
dehumanization to be someone who is less than human (and thus not worthy of moral 
concern or respectful treatment; Haslam, 2015) it stands to reason that within romantic 
relationships, a partner that dehumanizes their significant other may also engage in emotional 
abuse, domestic violence, and other abusive maltreatments.  
Furthermore, based on previous findings in which dehumanization has been shown to 
have a negative impact on self-perception (e.g., feelings of shame and guilt; Bastian & 
Haslam, 2011), we also examined the association between dehumanization and positive 
appraisals of the self (i.e., feeling proud, confident, and strong).   
Consistent with our predictions in Study 2, we expected that being the target and 
perpetrator of dehumanization would be negatively associated with positive relationship 
behaviors, positively associated with negative relationship behaviors (including emotional 
and physical abuse), and negatively associated with relationship quality. It was also predicted 
that being the target of dehumanization would be negatively associated with positive self-
appraisals.  
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 328 participants (27% men, 72 % women, 1% gender not 
specified) recruited online (using the same social networking sites as Studies 1 and 2) from 
the United States (51%), Canada (5%), Australia (42%), and New Zealand (2%). Participants 
ranged in age from 18 to 60 years (M=23.40, SD=6.43) and were all currently in a romantic 
relationship (M=2.40 years, SD=4.27). Relationship status consisted of participants who were 
steadily dating (51%), cohabiting (25%), engaged (8%), and married (16%).  
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Materials and procedure 
As with Studies 1 and 2, participants completed an anonymous online survey. 
Participation took approximately 20 minutes. The survey contained many of the same 
assessments used in Study 2 (i.e., the same demographic questions, the DIRRS to assess 
being the target and perpetrator of dehumanization, the TENSE [Ruehlman & Karoly, 1991] 
to assess negative interactions, the CPQ-SF [Furtis et al, 2010] to assess communication 
patterns, and the PRQC-SF [Fletcher et al., 2000] to measure relationship quality. In addition 
to these measures, the survey included measures of emotional and physical abuse and self-
appraisals. These are described below. 
 Emotional abuse. Participants completed the restrictive engulfment (7-items) and 
dominance/intimidation (7-items) subscales of the Multidimensional Measure of Emotional 
Abuse (Murphy & Hoover, 1999) in order to provide an assessment of both their experience 
and perpetration of emotional abuse. Participants are required to rate emotional abuse items 
in terms of the number of times they and their partner enacted the abuse in the past 6-months 
(i.e., 0 [never in the past 6 months] to 6 [>20 times]). Items were summed to create a total 
emotional abuse experience score (α=.80) and a total emotional abuse perpetration score 
(α=.75) for each participant.  
Physical abuse. Participants also completed the overt physical violence (7-items) and 
restrictive violence (3-items) subscales of the Abuse Within Intimate Relationships Scale 
(AIRS; Borjesson, Aarons, & Dunn, 2003). Participants were asked to indicate how often 
physical abuse behaviors occur in their current romantic relationship on a 7-point rating scale 
ranging from 1 (never) to 7 (always). Items were asked twice, once to assess the experience 
of physical abuse (α=.80), and again to assess the perpetration of physical abuse (α=.90).  
Self-appraisal. Participants were required to rate the extent to which they generally 
feel strong, proud, and confident. Each of these items is rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 
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1 (very slightly, or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Scores from these items were then averaged to 
create a composite score of positive self-appraisal (α=.73). 
Results and Discussion 
The descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between the four factors of the 
DIRRS (for both perpetration and target versions) and the criterion-related validity variables 
are presented in Tables 5 and 6. As predicted (and consistent with Study 2 results), across 
both versions of the DIRRS, the four subscales were found to positively correlate with the 
use of demand-withdrawal communication and negatively with positive communication. 
Similarly, across both versions of the measure, all four subscales were negatively associated 
with reports of relationship quality (see Tables 5 and 6). Additionally, for the target version 
of the DIRRS, moderate associations were again found (see Study 2) between the 
dehumanization subscales and reports of partner hostility, insensitivity, interference, and 
ridicule (as indexed by the TENSE subscales; see Table 5). 
In line with further predictions, all dehumanization subscales of the DIRRS were 
moderately positively correlated with the experience of emotional abuse (see Tables 5 and 6). 
In addition, scores on all but one DIRRS subscale (i.e., social refinement [target version]) 
were significantly positively correlated with the experience of physical abuse. Similarly, 
scores on all but the social refinement subscale of the target version of the DIRRS were 
found to correlate negatively with positive self-appraisals. While the social refinement 
subscale for the target version of the DIRRS failed to reach significance for both the physical 
abuse and self-appraisal associations, the direction of these correlations was consistent with 
the other dehumanization factors.  
In summary, the results of Study 3 provide support for the criterion validity findings 
from Study 2 for both the target and perpetration versions of the DIRRS. The reported 
associations between the target dehumanization subscales and self-appraisals are also 
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consistent with previous research in which dehumanization has been shown to have a 
negative association with self-perception (e.g., Bastian and Haslam, 2011). In particular, 
being denied humanness by one’s romantic partner appears to have implications for how 
individuals perceive themselves in terms of variables related to ego and self-efficacy (i.e., 
feeling proud, confident, and strong). Furthermore, the findings of the current study suggest 
that dehumanization is associated with extreme and serious negative relationship behaviors, 
namely emotional and physical abuse. Findings from Study 3, therefore, further support the 
link between dehumanization and the unacceptable treatment of others. This suggests that 
within romantic relationships denying humanness may give people a license to aggress or 
abuse their partner. 
General Discussion 
Despite increasing interest in the study of interpersonal dehumanization, there 
remains little research into this phenomenon within the context of romantic relationships. A 
major barrier in linking dehumanization to the study of romantic relationships is that no 
measure exists to assess dehumanization within this interpersonal context. Furthermore, 
ambiguity exists regarding the factor structure of interpersonal dehumanization. With these 
limitations in mind, the current paper reports on the development and psychometric 
evaluation of the Dehumanization in Romantic Relationships Scale (DIRRS). The DIRRS 
significantly extends on past measures of dehumanization by providing a multifaceted 
assessment of dehumanization within romantic relationships that accounts for both 
perpetrator and target perspectives.  
The current paper advances on current conceptualizations of dehumanization by 
proposing that dehumanization within romantic relationships (and possibly, interpersonal 
relationships more generally) consists of four related but distinct facets (each possessing 
good internal reliability). This novel factor structure decomposes the denial of human 
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uniqueness and human nature into two factors respectively—immaturity/competence and 
social refinement (denials of human uniqueness), and conditional regard and dissociation 
(denials of human nature). Not only do these facets represent key features of the denial of 
humanness described in the literature (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2011; Haslam, 2006, 2015; 
Haslam et al., 2013), but the implication is that not all denials of human uniqueness should be 
considered as conceptually equivalent; likewise, for denials of human nature. That is, to treat 
a partner as immature or incompetent is not the same as treating them as lacking social 
refinement. Similarly, treating someone with conditional regard is not analogous to engaging 
in dissociation. The factor structure constituting these facets was replicated across Studies 1 
and 2, with the four factor first-order model consistently found to be of better fit compared to 
all other factor structures. Moreover, the same four factor model equally applied to the 
perpetrator and target versions of the DIRRS. 
Across Studies 2 and 3, the dehumanization facets in both versions of the DIRRS 
were also associated with criterion-related variables in ways that were in line with 
predictions. All four facets were positively associated with destructive communication 
patterns, negative partner behaviors such as hostility, insensitivity, interference (including 
care that was intrusive), and ridicule. In contrast the facets were negatively associated with 
constructive communication patterns, the provision of sensitive-proximal care, relationship 
quality, regard for one’s partner and positive self-appraisals (only measured in Study 3). 
These findings provide the first evidence that romantic relationship dehumanization 
attenuates positive relationship appraisals and functioning but amplifies negative appraisals 
of oneself and partner, exacerbating negative relationship processes. Furthermore, the 
associations found between the DIRRS and emotional and physical abuse (Study 3) highlight 
that dehumanization is indeed associated with relationship behaviors that extend into the 
realm of intimate partner violence and aggression. In this way, the findings of Study 3 
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suggest that just as dehumanization may be an explanatory mechanism for intergroup 
prejudice, discrimination and aggression (e.g., Bandura, 1999; Haslam, 2015; Kteily & 
Bruneau, 2017; Kteily et al., 2015), so too, may dehumanization act as an impelling factor in 
the manifestation of interpersonal abuse. Therefore, future research should investigate 
dehumanization as a possible explanatory mechanism for the manifestation of abuse within 
romantic relationships.  
Although the four factor first-order model of dehumanization (see Figure 2, Model 3) 
was the best fitting model (see Tables 1 and 2), we note that both the one and two factor 
higher-order models (see Figure 2, Models 4 and 5) also produced good to very good fit. This 
suggests that the four first-order factors may indeed represent specific substrates of human 
uniqueness, human nature, or dehumanization overall. Thus, researchers may also be 
interested in using the DIRRS to compute higher-order factors3 if they wish to aggregate up 
to more global assessments of interpersonal dehumanization. It is important to note, however, 
that omitting the four factors from the modeling of dehumanization by way of the DIRRS 
reduces fit significantly—which speaks to the substantive and empirical need to model these 
dehumanization facets within the context of romantic relationships. 
Limitations and Future Directions  
Although we find highly consistent results across the three studies in terms of the 
construct and criterion-related validity of the DIRRS, each sample was by-and-large a 
community, non-clinical sample that on average reported low levels of dehumanization. 
Researchers, therefore, should attempt to confirm our findings using a more diverse sample 
including distressed or high-conflict couples. An understanding of how couples characterized 
                                                 
3 In a series of preliminary analyses, we calculated human nature, human uniqueness and 
dehumanization overall subscales to represent the one and two factor higher-order models, 
respectively. Associations between these broader subscales and previously mentioned 
criterion-related variables were found to be similar to what is noted in Tables 1 – 6. 
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by high stress and negativity engage in dehumanization may provide important insights into 
understanding key contextual factors affecting couples and families. These factors may 
include financial stress, a history of troublesome family relationships, and other contextual 
variables indicative of harsh or unpredictable environments. Furthermore, future research 
should implement the DIRRS within dyadic contexts, in order to account for the influence 
that both members of a couple have on their own and their partner’s experience of being the 
perpetrator and target of dehumanization.  
In addition, although we developed and validated the DIRRS using data from 
individuals currently in romantic relationships, we believe the measure can be readily adapted 
to assess other types of relationships, including parent-child relationships and relationships 
between peers and colleagues. Finally, future research should investigate whether 
dehumanization plays a causal role in the enactment of emotional and physical abuse, or 
merely a variable that is associated with, but not a causal factor of, negative relationship 
experiences. 
Conclusion 
Despite increasing scholarly interest in the concept of dehumanization, and recent 
application of the phenomenon to the study of interpersonal processes, we still know very 
little about the manifestation of dehumanization within romantic relationships. We also do 
not clearly understand the consequences of being denied humanness by one’s romantic 
partner. This paper has made some novel and important contributions to the study of 
dehumanization, enhancing the field’s understanding of how dehumanization is 
conceptualized, assessed, and evaluated within romantic relationships. It is hoped that the 
DIRRS spurs on dehumanization research within the context of romantic (and other close) 
relationships, continuing the growth of dehumanization research within the field of social 
psychology, and in particular the study of interpersonal processes. 
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Figure 1. Alternative conceptualizations of dehumanization 
Note. Standardized factor loadings and covariances for perpetration items are 
presented in parentheses.   
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Figure 2. New conceptualizations of interpersonal dehumanization. 
Note. Standardized factor loadings and covariances for perpetration items are 
presented in parentheses.
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Table 1.  
Study 1 Chi-square difference tests for perpetration and target versions of the DIRRS. 
Model χ2 df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR Comparison χ2  df  
Perpetration          
Model 1 (Single factor) 1702.778 54 .688 .618 .156 .095 Model 1 and 
Model 3 
1436.471*** 6 
Model 2 (2 correlated factors) 1281.402 53 .767 .710 .136 .091 Model 2 and 
Model 3 
1015.095*** 5 
Model 3 (4 correlated factors) 266.307 48 .959 .943 .060 .044 -- -- -- 
Model 4 (4 first-order factors, 2 
second-order factors) 
289.491 49 .954 .939 .063 .049 Model 4 and 
Model 3 
23.341*** 1 
Model 5 (4 first-order factors, 1 
second-order factor) 
299.648 50 .953 .938 .063 .048 Model 5 and 
Model 3 
33.341*** 2 
 
 
Target 
         
Model 1 (Single factor) 1788.304 54 .741 .683 .160 .086 Model 1 and 
Model 3 
1438.818*** 6 
Model 2 (2 correlated factors) 1509.947 53 .782 .729 .148 .085 Model 2 and 
Model 3 
1160.461*** 5 
Model 3 (4 correlated factors) 349.486 48 .955 .938 .070 .044 -- -- -- 
Model 4 (4 first-order factors, 2 
second-order factors) 
349.524 49 .955 .940 .070 .044 Model 4 and 
Model 3 
.038 1 
Model 5 (4 first-order factors, 1 
second-order factor) 
349.611 50 .955 .941 .069 .044 Model 5 and 
Model 3 
.125 2 
Note. χ2 = Chi-square; df = degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Residual. 
***p < .001 
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Table 2.  
Study 2 Chi-square difference tests for perpetration and target versions of the DIRRS. 
Model χ2 df CFI TLI RMSEA SRMR Comparison χ2  df  
Perpetration          
Model 1 (Single factor) 1096.163 54 .634 .553 .151 .102 Model 1 and 
Model 3 
867.622*** 6 
Model 2 (2 correlated factors) 739.579 53 .759 .700 .124 .102 Model 2 and 
Model 3 
511.038*** 5 
Model 3 (4 correlated factors) 228.541 48 .937 .913 .067 .054 -- -- -- 
Model 4 (4 first-order factors, 2 
second-order factors) 
232.754 49 .936 .923 .067 .056 Model 4 and 
Model 3 
4.312* 1 
Model 5 (4 first-order factors, 1 
second-order factor) 
243.693 50 .932 .910 .068 .056 Model 5 and 
Model 3 
15.152** 2 
 
 
Target 
         
Model 1 (Single factor) 1278.656 54 .665 .590 .164 .102 Model 1 and 
Model 3 
954.969*** 6 
Model 2 (2 correlated factors) 1015.654 53 .736 .672 .147 .085 Model 2 and 
Model 3 
691.967*** 5 
Model 3 (4 correlated factors) 323.687 48 .925 .900 .080 .053 -- -- -- 
Model 4 (4 first-order factors, 2 
second-order factors) 
331.658 49 .923 .896 .083 .057 Model 4 and 
Model 3 
.038** 1 
Model 5 (4 first-order factors, 1 
second-order factor) 
333.704 50 .922 .897 .082 .055 Model 5 and 
Model 3 
.125** 2 
Note. Note. χ2 = Chi-square; df = degrees of freedom; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; TLI = Tucker Lewis Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Residual. 
 *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Table 3. 
Study 2 descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between the target version of the DIRRS and other study variables  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Immaturity/Competence -- 
 
           
2. Social refinement .43** --           
3. Conditional regard 
 
.40** .57** --          
4. Dissociation 
 
.36** .38** .45** --         
5. Hostility  
 
.49** .37** .44** .42** -- 
 
       
6. Insensitivity 
 
.44** .47** .65** .38** .69** --       
7. Interference .49** .42** .59** .50** .69** .66** -- 
 
     
8. Ridicule .49** .55** .62** .50** .68** .82** .64** -- 
 
    
9. Relationship quality -.29** -.31** -.48** -.34** -.32** -.44** -.39** -.46** -- 
 
   
10. Demand-withdrawal .38** .35** .40** .39** .51** .56** .50** .48** -.32** --   
11. Positive communication -.28** -.31** -.43** -.28** -.24** -.41** -.31** -.41** .51** -.45** --  
12. Positive regard -.35** -.29** -.50** -.46** -.41** -.44** -.51** -.45** .72** -.42** .47** -- 
Mean  
Standard Deviation 
N 847 
2.12 
1.03 
 
1.52 
.77 
 
1.67 
.88 
1.82 
2.34 
 
2.34 
1.46 
 
2.61 
1.65 
 
2.13 
1.21 
 
2.21 
1.30 
 
5.80 
.98 
18.64 
8.74 
 
19.65 
5.43 
5.40 
.63 
Note. **p < .01 
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Table 4 
Study 2 descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between the perpetration version of the DIRRS and other study variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   
1. Immaturity/Competence -- 
 
           
2. Social refinement .48** --           
3. Conditional regard 
 
.38** .45** --          
4. Dissociation 
 
.27** .27** .33** --         
5. Proximal caregiving -.27** -.34** -.37** -.12** -- 
 
       
6. Sensitive caregiving -.19** -.25** -.33** -.22** .42** -- 
 
      
7. Cooperative caregiving -.51** -.36** -.34** -.20** .33** .37** -- 
 
     
8. Compulsive caregiving .28** .17* .10** .19** .03 -.15** -.43** --     
9. Relationship quality -.33** .35** -.40** -.35** .43** .36** -.25** .05 --    
10. Positive regard -.48** -.53** -.51** -.35** .57** .38** -.42** .10** .72** --   
11. Demand Withdrawal .43** .31** .34** .36** -.27** -.31** -.44** -.28** -.32** -.42** --  
12. Positive communication -.26** -.24* -.31** -.31** .30** .37** .28** .15* .51** .47** -.45** -- 
Mean  
Standard Deviation 
N 847 
2.25 
1.11 
 
1.53 
.75 
 
1.45 
.65 
1.70 
.95 
 
5.31 
.72 
 
4.46 
.94 
4.37 
.90 
3.08 
.96 
5.80 
.98 
5.40 
.63 
18.64 
8.74 
 
19.65 
5.43 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 5 
Study 3 descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between the perpetration version of the DIRRS and other study variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Immaturity/Competence -- 
 
        
2. Social refinement .46** --        
3. Conditional regard 
 
.37** .37** --       
4. Dissociation 
 
.31** .15* .42** --      
5. Relationship quality -.35** -.32** -.34* -.33** --     
6. Emotional abuse perpetration .32** .22** .24** .38** -.26** --    
7. Physical abuse perpetration .30** .12* .30** .29** -.23** .18** --   
8. Demand-withdrawal .47** .32** .41** .50** -.27** .46** .24** --  
9. Positive communication -.33** -.13* -.26** -.36** .35** -.24** -.21** -.46** -- 
Mean  
Standard Deviation 
N 328 
2.01 
1.03 
 
1.31 
.61 
 
1.34 
.58 
1.68 
1.01 
 
6.09 
.80 
 
4.57 
5.78 
1.10 
.31 
21.16 
6.09 
 
6.09 
.80 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 6. 
Study 3 descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations between the target version of the DIRRS and other study variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Immaturity/Competence -- 
 
             
2. Social refinement .48** --             
3. Conditional regard 
 
.48** .47** --            
4. Dissociation 
 
.47** .29** .43** --           
5. Hostility  
 
.56** .44** .51** .51** -- 
 
         
6. Insensitivity 
 
.41** .45** .66** .34** .59** --         
7. Interference .27** .27** .32** .46** .43** .38** -- 
 
       
8. Ridicule .24** .28** .20** .18** .26** .15** .23** -- 
 
      
9. Relationship quality -.26** -.29** -.42** -.44** -.31** -.45** -.42** -.11 -- 
 
     
10. Demand-withdrawal .44** .30** .46** .49** .60** .49** .30** .25** -.27** --     
11. Positive communication -.34** -.31** -.37** -.24** -.36** -.39** -.21** -.11 .35** -.46** --    
12. Emotional abuse target .40** .40** .40** .53** .60** .40** .48** .30** -.34** .46** -.30** --   
13. Physical abuse target .12* .06 .19** .17** .15** .20** .12* .15** -.16** .25** -.08 .21** --  
14. Self-appraisal -.14* -.09 -.15* -.21* -.07 -.14* -.10 -.03 .23* -.14* .19** -.13* .02 -- 
Mean  
Standard Deviation 
N 328 
2.04 
1.19 
 
1.41 
.81 
 
1.51 
.85 
1.66 
1.07 
 
2.00 
.66 
 
1.72 
.75 
 
1.50 
.63 
 
1.39 
.59 
 
18.46 
9.00 
21.16 
6.09 
 
6.09 
.80 
4.15 
6.30 
1.10 
.23 
3.32 
.89 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01 
Chapter 3 – Measuring Interpersonal Dehumanization 91 
Appendix A 
 
The Dehumanization in Romantic Relationships Scale (DIRRS) consists of 24 items (12 
items that assess dehumanization perpetration and 12 items that assess dehumanization 
receipt). Each statement is answered on a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from 1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree). For the perpetration items, instructions are to rate each item 
based on how the individual generally behaves in their romantic relationship. For the target 
items, instructions are to rate each item based on how their romantic partner generally 
behaves. Factor categories are shown below as subheadings and should be omitted when the 
scale is administered.  
 
Generally, I treat my partner… Generally, my partner treats me… 
Immaturity/competence Immaturity/competence 
… as if they were a child … as if I am a child* 
… as if they are immature  … as if I am immature* 
… as if they can’t manage on their own … as if I can’t manage on my own 
Social refinement Social refinement 
… as if they embarrass me … as if I embarrass them 
… as if they lack social status … as if I lack social status 
… as if I am ashamed of them … as if they are ashamed of me 
Conditional regard Conditional regard 
… as a means to an end … as a means to an end* 
… as if they are only valuable for what 
they can offer 
… as if I am only valuable for what I can 
offer 
… as if their opinion doesn’t count … as if my opinion doesn’t count 
Dissociation Dissociation 
… as if they are heartless … as if I am heartless 
… as if they are unresponsive  … as if I am unresponsive 
… as if they are cold … as if I am cold 
 
 
*Denotes items retained from Bastian and Haslam’s (2011) measure of dehumanization 
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Chapter 3 Conclusion 
This chapter entailed Paper 2, which described the development and validation of the 
Dehumanization in Romantic Relationships Scale (DIRRS). The DIRRS captures both 
perpetrator and target perspectives, offering researchers the means by which to assess 
dehumanization within close and intimate relationships. In addition, Paper 2 identified and 
cross-validated the dimensional structure of interpersonal dehumanization. In particular, 
dehumanization within intimate relationships (and possibly, interpersonal relationships more 
generally) consists of four related but distinct facets. Consequently, interpersonal 
dehumanization may be more nuanced than initially considered such that it extends beyond 
the broader unidimensional and bidimensional conceptualizations. Having said this, the 
DIRRS can also be used to calculate broad (i.e., general) subscales of dehumanization (e.g., 
denial of human nature and denial of human uniqueness, or a unitary score on 
dehumanization) as it appears that these facets may be hierarchically nested within more 
global subscales.  
Paper 2 also provides the first empirical evidence for the association between 
dehumanization and a wide range of negative relationship behaviors—some of which extend 
into the realm of intimate partner maltreatment (i.e., emotional and physical abuse). While 
these initial findings provide support for the link between dehumanization and maltreatment 
within close and intimate relationships, this work is cross-sectional in nature and merely 
reflects one set of findings. Therefore, Chapter 4 (which includes Paper 3) reports on an 
investigation into whether people’s perpetration of intimate partner abuse over time is 
predicted by the extent to which they engage in dehumanization.
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CHAPTER 4: THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DEHUMANIZATION AND 
INTIMATE PARTNER ABUSE 
In Chapter 2, dehumanization was described as the underlying feature of hurtful 
experiences within interpersonal contexts. In particular, a constellation of commonly studied 
hurtful and aversive behaviors (many of which constitute partner maltreatment [e.g., 
contempt, hostility, controlling behaviors and conditional regard]) were explained in terms of 
the various denials of humanness they encompass. In Chapter 3, dehumanization (both 
perpetration and targeting) was positively associated with various facets of maltreatment—of 
which the most explicit was emotional and physical abuse. These initial findings reported in 
Paper 2 (Chapter 3) linking dehumanization to emotional and physical abuse provide 
evidence that dehumanization is indeed associated with relationship behaviors that constitute 
intimate partner maltreatment. Furthermore, the findings and conclusions drawn from the 
previous chapters also provide indirect support to the long-held view (i.e., from the 
intergroup literature) that perpetrators of dehumanization are less likely to experience 
empathic distress or guilt for an abhorrent or violent act and are less likely to condemn 
oneself for such an act (e.g., Bandura, 1999; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Kelman, 1976; 
Kteily & Bruneau, 2017)—highlighting how the phenomenon may function as a predictor of 
violent, aggressive and abusive acts (Haslam, 2015; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the findings from Paper 2 (reported in Chapter 3) are cross-sectional in 
nature and represent only one set of results. Additionally, no research has tested this 
(proposed) causal assumption by way of research using experimental and longitudinal 
designs. Therefore, the Paper 3 (reported in this chapter) addresses this important gap in 
research by testing the causal assumption between dehumanization and maltreatment, and 
doing so, within the context of close intimate relationships. It is important to note that as part 
of Paper 3, dehumanization is calculated at the global (i.e., total/overall) level only. This was 
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done in order to ensure adequate sample size to estimate the variance-covariance models 
developed and to reduce the likelihood of convergence problems as well as biased estimates 
or standard errors (see Bentler & Chou, 1987; Jackson, 2003; Newsom, 2015). 
  
Chapter 4 – Dehumanization and Abuse 101 
The research article that follows is the author’s copy of a manuscript submitted to the Journal 
of Social and Personal Relationships. 
 
Pizzirani, B., & Karantzas, G. C. (In press). The Association Between Dehumanization and 
Intimate Partner Abuse.  
 
Figure 1 is included at the back the manuscript in accordance with journal submission 
requirements.  
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Abstract 
The extent to which individuals perceive one another as fully human has consequences for 
how others are inevitably treated. Despite the role that dehumanization is thought to play in 
facilitating maltreatment towards others, there is a dearth of research regarding the extent to 
which the perpetration of dehumanization is associated with intimate partner abuse. 
Therefore, the aim of the current study was to delineate the longitudinal association between 
the perpetration of dehumanization and the perpetration of emotional and physical abuse 
within romantic relationships. Latent Growth Curve Modelling (LGCM) was used to model 
whether the trajectory (i.e., intercept and slope) of dehumanization across a six-week period 
predicted changes in the perpetration of abuse measured at baseline and two-months post. It 
was found that a cubic non-linear change in dehumanization perpetration (defined by a 
combination of decreases and acute upsurges) was positively associated with increases in 
both outcome variables (i.e., emotional and physical abuse). This work directly affirms 
theory and past empirical evidence that dehumanization is a factor that facilitates the 
maltreatment of others and extends on past research by suggesting that the maltreatment of 
others by way of dehumanization is not confined to intergroup contexts, but rather can be 
perpetrated against those whom we regard as our most intimate and closest of ties.  
 
Keywords: Dehumanization; interpersonal relationships; abuse; maltreatment. 
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The Association Between Dehumanization and Intimate Partner Abuse 
“The only bond worth anything between human beings is their humanness”.  
Jesse Owens, 1936 
As underscored in the quote above, there exists an understanding (both in lay- and academic 
perspectives) that the extent to which individuals perceive one another as fully human has 
consequences for how others are inevitably treated. The focus on dehumanization in this 
paper reflects the increasing emphasis on studying this phenomenon in interpersonal 
contexts, but also represents an important theorized mechanism that may assist in explaining 
partner maltreatment (specifically, emotional and physical abuse). Indeed, past research has 
highlighted that dehumanization reduces pro-social behavior (Vaes, Paladino, & Leyens, 
2002), while recent theorizing contends that dehumanization increases the likelihood of 
aggression against another (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017).  
Put simply, dehumanization refers to the perception or treatment of another person as 
lacking human qualities (Bain, Vaes & Leyens, 2014; Haslam, 2006; Haslam & Stratemeyer, 
2016). Relevant to the present study, dehumanization is theorized to be an important factor 
that allows for an individual or group to be maltreated (Bandura 1999; Haslam, 2015)—of 
which a form of maltreatment is intimate partner abuse (Higgins & McCabe, 2000). Despite 
the role that dehumanization is thought to play in facilitating maltreatment (such as abuse) or 
aggression towards others, there is a dearth of research regarding the extent to which the 
perpetration of dehumanization is associated with intimate partner abuse. Furthermore, 
research is yet to investigate whether people’s perpetration of intimate partner abuse over 
time is predicted by the extent to which they engage in dehumanization. This paper, 
therefore, reports on a longitudinal investigation of whether the change in one’s perpetration 
of dehumanization over time is associated with changes in one’s perpetration of emotional 
and physical abuse. 
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Dehumanization  
Dehumanization is defined as perceiving an individual or group as lacking qualities 
that are uniquely or essentially human—qualities that separate humans from non-human 
entities, such animals or inanimate objects (e.g., robots and machines; Bain, Vaes & Leyens, 
2014; Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016; Haslam et al., 2013). According to Haslam (2006), 
humans are distinguished from animals on attributes involving intelligence, civility, and 
social refinement, and differ from inanimate objects—such as machines and robots—on the 
basis of emotionality and interpersonal warmth (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). When human 
uniqueness attributes are denied, people are dehumanized in the way that they are likened to 
animals and seen as primitive, childlike, irrational, or unintelligent (Haslam, 2006; Bain et 
al., 2009). When human nature attributes are denied, people are dehumanized in the way that 
they are likened to inanimate objects or pre-programmed machines, and seen as cold, rigid or 
lacking emotion (Bastian & Haslam, 2011; Haslam, 2006). Thus, dehumanization comprises 
the denial of characteristics reflective of human uniqueness and human nature. 
Historically, the study of dehumanization has largely occurred within the contexts of 
intergroup conflicts (Haslam, 2015) and blatant acts of atrocity (e.g., the Jewish Holocaust or 
the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria; Bandura, Barabaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, 1996; 
Haslman & Stratmeyer, 2016; Kelman, 1976; Staub, 1989). More recent research, however, 
has also suggested that dehumanization can occur within daily social interactions (Bastian, 
Jetten, & Haslam, 2014)—in which people routinely act in ways that benefit themselves 
while causing harm to others (Bandura, 1999). Nevertheless, this research has not 
investigated dehumanization within the context of intimate close relations (such as people’s 
romantic relationships). Thus, our understanding to date regarding the associations between 
dehumanization and serious maltreatments such as abuse, are largely confined to the 
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intergroup literature and social psychology more generally (e.g., Haslam, 2015; Haslam & 
Stratemeyer, 2016; Kteily & Bruneau, 2017).  
According to these past and current lines of intergroup and social psychology 
research, the tendency to dehumanize is associated with enacting violence and aggression 
because perceiving someone as less than human short-circuits an individual’s ability to 
inhibit aggressive or abusive tendencies (Kelman, 1976; Staub, 1989). Therefore—largely 
because the target of the dehumanization is perceived to be expendable—harming the 
dehumanized target by ways of aggression and abuse is regarded as acceptable by the 
perpetrator (Opotow, 1990). Furthermore, because the target of dehumanization is perceived 
as lacking human qualities (in particular the capacity to experience emotions) perpetrators are 
less likely to experience empathic distress or guilt (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014) and less 
likely to condemn oneself for immoral, aggressive, or abusive acts (Haslam, 2015). In 
summary, dehumanization enables the perpetrator to act abusively and violently because they 
perceive the target of dehumanization to be someone who is less than human and inferior, 
and thus not worthy of moral consideration or respectful treatment.  
Interpersonal Dehumanization and Intimate Partner Abuse 
To view and treat another individual as less than human may sound extreme, 
however, it is a common and widespread phenomenon (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Indeed, 
theory and research suggest that dehumanization can manifest in relatively implicit forms 
within everyday social interactions, rather than limited to the occurrence of moral atrocities, 
such as mass violence or genocide (see Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2000). More recently, a 
number of studies have shown that within interpersonal contexts, dehumanization is in fact a 
commonplace phenomenon that is perpetrated by close others (such as romantic partners, 
family, and friends) and associated with interpersonal maltreatments (e.g., being degraded, 
demoralized, or invalidated; Adams, 2014; Bastian & Haslam, 2010, 2011; Bastian et al., 
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2014; Bastian, Jetten, & Radke, 2012; Pizzirani & Karantzas, 2018, Pizzirani, Karantzas, & 
Mullins, 2018). For example, Bastian and Haslam (2011) found that a number of common 
interpersonal maltreatments (e.g., being treated with contempt, condescension, and everyday 
thoughtlessness) were experienced as dehumanizing, and that the dehumanization 
encompassed both the denials of human nature and human uniqueness.  
However, the vast majority of research into dehumanization within interpersonal 
contexts has not specifically focused on romantic relationships. Furthermore, while some 
researchers allude to an association between dehumanization and intimate partner abuse (e.g., 
Bastian et al., 2014), only one publication has provided empirical evidence for this 
association (Pizzirani et al., 2018). Specifically, in a recent series of studies, Pizzirani et al. 
(2018) found that the perpetration of dehumanization was positively associated with the 
perpetration of emotional and physical abuse. These initial findings provide proof-of-concept 
that dehumanization is indeed associated with relationship behaviors that extend into the 
realm of intimate partner maltreatment and abuse. This work, however, merely reflects one 
set of findings, and the associations evidenced between the perpetration of dehumanization 
and emotional and physical abuse were cross-sectional in nature. Therefore, attempts at 
replicating these associations are necessary to not only determine the consistency of these 
findings, but to provide some sense of the directionality (i.e., causation) of these associations. 
To this end, research should not limit the study of dehumanization and intimate partner abuse 
to cross-sectional designs; rather, the longitudinal associations between these variables 
should be estimated by way of prospective methodologies. Investigating the association 
between these variables over time is also necessary for two additional reasons central to the 
study of dehumanization and to the study of romantic relationships. 
Firstly, the theoretical work into dehumanization largely implies that dehumanization 
is an impelling factor that causes an individual to engage in the maltreatment of others in the 
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form of aggression, violence, or abuse (Bandura 1999; Bandura et al., 1996; Haslam, 2015; 
Kelman, 1976; Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1989). No research, however, has tested this (proposed) 
causal assumption by way of research using experimental and longitudinal designs. The 
current study therefore addresses an important gap in the literature in testing the underlying 
causal assumption between dehumanization and maltreatment.  
Secondly, it is now widely acknowledged that many relational phenomena are 
dynamic in nature (e.g., Gottman, Murray, Swanson, Tyson, & Swanson, 2002; Karney & 
Bradbury, 1995). For instance, numerous studies have found that positive relationship 
behaviors (e.g., responsiveness and social support; Canevello & Crocker, 2010; Overall, 
Fletcher, & Simpson, 2010) as well as negative relationship behaviors (e.g., destructive 
conflict patterns; Holley, 2011; Noller, Feeney, Bonnell & Callan, 1994) demonstrate change 
over time. Moreover, research has demonstrated that changes within one relationship 
phenomenon is associated with fluctuations within another relationship phenomenon – 
whether it be relationship behavior, cognition or affect (e.g., Gottman et al., 2002). For 
example, Rubin and Campbell (2012) found that changes in intimacy were associated with 
fluctuations in relationship passion and sexual intercourse on a given day.  
Such change dynamics are also likely to apply to phenomena such as dehumanization 
and intimate partner abuse. Although longitudinal research into both these phenomena is 
largely non-existent, implicit and explicit theorizing in relation to both constructs suggests 
that dehumanization and intimate partner abuse are likely to demonstrate instability (e.g., 
Buckels & Trapnell, 2013; Fasoli, et al., 2015; Follingstad, Rutledge, Berg, Hause, & Polek, 
1990; Gwinn, Judd, & Park, 2013; Haslam & Stratemeyer, 2016). That is, these phenomena 
are likely to include some degree of variability due to various contextual factors (e.g., an 
atmosphere of high couple conflict) and individual difference variables (i.e., dark triad/tetrad 
traits, see Bastian, this issue; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015; Malamuth, 2003) 
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that may increase or attenuate tendencies to dehumanize another (for review see Kteily & 
Bruneau, 2017) or perpetrate intimate partner abuse. In this way, studying changes in these 
variables over time as well as the change dynamics between these variables (i.e., how change 
in one variable is associated with change in another variable) is critical in understanding 
whether there is a particular trajectory of dehumanization that impels an individual to escalate 
the perpetration of emotional and physical abuse of one’s partner over time.  
Current study 
For decades, scholars have noted how the denial of humanness can lead to the 
immoral or deprecating treatment of others (e.g., Allport, 1954, 1979; Bandura, 1999; 
Haslam, 2006, 2015; Kelman, 1976; Kteily & Bruneau, 2017; Opotow, 1999; Staub, 1989). 
This enduring understanding of dehumanization highlights how the phenomenon may 
function as a predictor of violent, aggressive and abusive acts (Haslam, 2015; Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014). Nevertheless, there exists little by way of longitudinal research to 
determine the extent to which dehumanization is indeed a predictor of maltreatment. 
Furthermore, there is a dearth of research investigating whether the perpetration of 
dehumanization is associated with intimate partner abuse—a form of maltreatment specific to 
the context of romantic relationships. To address these limitations, the aim of the current 
study was to delineate the longitudinal association between the perpetration of 
dehumanization and the perpetration of emotional and physical abuse within romantic 
relationships. In particular, the current investigation focuses on how change within 
dehumanization perpetration over time is associated with changes in the perpetration of 
emotional and physical intimate partner abuse.  
Method 
Participants 
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The sample consisted of 174 participants (27% men, 72 % women, 1% gender not 
specified) recruited online (using social networking sites such as Facebook, Gumtree and 
Reddit) from Australia (50%), the United States (43%), Canada (6%) and New Zealand (1%). 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 60 years (M=28.13, SD=8.69) and were all currently in 
a romantic relationship (M=4.87 years, SD=6.60). Relationship status consisted of 
participants who were steadily dating (45%), cohabiting (21%), engaged (8%), and married 
(26%).  
Materials and procedure  
Across a period of two months, participants completed eight surveys (one survey per 
week; Time 1 [T1] to Time 8 [T8]) as part of an online longitudinal study. The surveys, 
which took approximately five minutes to complete on each occasion, consisted of a series of 
demographic questions and self-report measures. The weekly online questionnaires were 
administered to participants by way of an email that included a URL link to the respective 
weekly survey to be completed. The measures included across the weekly surveys are 
described below. 
Demographics (collected at T1 only). Included general questions concerning the 
participant’s age, gender, country of residence, relationship status and relationship length.  
Dehumanization (collected at T2 to T7). To assess the extent to which participants 
dehumanized their romantic partner, the perpetration version of the Dehumanization in 
Romantic Relationships Scale (DIRRS; Pizzirani et al., 2018) was administered. The measure 
consists of 12 items rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) and includes items such as “At some point today I treated my partner as 
cold” and “At some point today I treated my partner as if they can’t manage on their own”. 
The DIRRS can be used to calculate broad subscales of dehumanization (e.g., denial of 
human nature and denial of human uniqueness) as well as facets nested within these broad 
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subscales (see Pizzirani et al., 2018). However, these subscales can also be aggregated to 
form a total (i.e., global) score for dehumanization perpetration (Pizzirani et al., 2018). 
Higher scores at the subscale and global scale level reflect greater dehumanization 
perpetration. Within the present study, global scores for dehumanization were calculated for 
surveys T2 to T7 (αs=.85—.86).  
 Emotional abuse (collected at T1 and T8). Participants completed the perpetration 
version of the restrictive engulfment (7-items) and dominance/intimidation (7-items) 
subscales of the Multidimensional Measure of Emotional Abuse (Murphy & Hoover, 1999) 
in order to provide an assessment of emotional abuse. Participants were required to rate the 
emotional abuse items in terms of the number of times they had abused their partner in the 
past 6-months (i.e., 0 [never in the past 6 months] to 6 [>20 times]). Items include statements 
such as, “Drove recklessly to frighten them” and “Tried to stop them from seeing certain 
friends or family members”. Items across subscales are summed to create a total emotional 
abuse score, with higher scores indicating greater perpetration of emotional abuse (α=.75).  
Physical abuse (collected at T1 and T8). Participants also completed the perpetration 
version of the overt physical violence (7-items) and restrictive violence (3-items) subscales of 
the Abuse Within Intimate Relationships Scale (AIRS; Borjesson, Aarons, & Dunn, 2003). 
Participants were asked to indicate how often they engaged in physically abusive behaviors in 
their current romantic relationship on a 7-point rating scale ranging from 1 (never) to 7 
(always). Items include statements such as “I have physically attacked my partner” and “I 
have used an object to hit my partner”. The two subscales are aggregated to form a total 
physical abuse score, with higher scores indicative of greater perpetration of physical abuse 
(α=.90).  
Data Analysis 
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Latent Growth Curve Modelling (LGCM) was used to model whether the trajectory 
(initial level [i.e., intercept] and rate of change [i.e., slope]) of dehumanization across T2 to 
T7) predicted changes in the perpetration of emotional and physical abuse measured at T1 
(i.e., baseline) and T8 (i.e., final survey assessment). Two separate LGCMs were conducted, 
one in which change in emotional abuse was the outcome variable, and another in which 
change in physical abuse was the outcome variable. Figure 1 illustrates an example of the 
LGCMs tested. As shown, the T2 to T7 assessments of dehumanization are modelled to load 
onto an intercept and a slope latent factor respectively. Given that the intercept reflects the 
initial levels of dehumanization perpetration, all loadings are scaled to unity (i.e., 1), while 
the slope values reflect parameters that indicate a particular rate of change. The values 
depicted in Figure 1, for example, reflect a linear change (i.e., 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7), and thus 
assumes that dehumanization would increase over time. In order to determine the most 
appropriate rate of change for dehumanization perpetration, we conducted preliminary 
analyses in which we tested and compared three possible trajectories of change – linear, 
quadratic and cubic. Across all models, the covariance between the slope and intercept was 
freely estimated. 
Once the rate of change that best fit the data was identified (see Results below), 
emotional and physical abuse were regressed onto the latent growth curve for 
dehumanization. As illustrated in Figure 1, given that physical and emotional abuse were 
collected at two time points, we modelled change over time by way of a Latent Change Score 
(Coman et al., 2013). The LCS is analogous to a paired samples t-test, in which the 
regression paths from T1 abuse and the LCS variable are scaled to unity (1), while the 
intercept for abuse at T8 is set to zero, as are the mean and variance of the residual error for 
abuse at T8. This parametrization of the LCS implies that scores for emotional or physical 
abuse at T8 are explained as a function of the LCS.   
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Results 
A series of preliminary LGCMs were conducted (without the LCS for emotional and 
physical abuse) in order to determine the trajectory that best fit dehumanization perpetration 
across T2 to T7. Assessment of model fit was based on the guidelines proposed by Hu and 
Bentler (1999)6. The application of a linear pattern for the slope of dehumanization resulted 
in a model of modest fit 2(3) = 10.669, p > .05; CFI = .928; RMSEA = .112; SRMR = .052. 
Similarly, the application of a quadratic trajectory also resulted in a model of modest fit 2(3) 
= 11.222, p > .05; CFI = .923; RMSEA = .126; SRMR = .054. Finally, the application of a 
cubic pattern resulted in a model that demonstrated excellent fit to the data 2(3) = 4.881, p > 
.05; CFI = .981; RMSEA = .060; SRMR = .018. Comparison across the three models of 
imposed trajectories on the basis of the CFI (see recommendations, Chen 2007; Cheung & 
Revensvold, 2002) revealed that the cubic trajectory was of better fit to the data than both the 
linear trajectory model (CFI = .053 [cubic model – linear model]) and the quadratic 
trajectory model (CFI = .058 [cubic model – quadratic model]). 
 The primary LGCM analyses were then conducted in which the LCS for physical 
abuse and emotional abuse were regressed onto the intercept and slope latent variables 
(modelling a cubic rate of change) for dehumanization. A separate LGCM was estimated for 
each outcome variable (i.e., physical and emotional abuse). The LGCM with emotional abuse 
as the outcome variable demonstrated acceptable fit to the data 2(17) = 43.601, p <.05; 
CFI=.911; RMSEA=.09; SRMR=.11. The intercept (β = .40, p <.05) and slope (β = .49, p < 
.05) for dehumanization were significantly positively associated with changes in emotional 
abuse. That is, higher initial levels of dehumanization, as well as a cubic non-linear change in 
                                                 
6 Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) ≥.95, Root Mean Square Error 
of Approximation (RMSEA) ≤.05, and Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR)=.06 are 
indicative of good fit. 
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dehumanization (points of upward acceleration in experiences of being the perpetrator of 
dehumanization) were associated with increases in emotional abuse over time. 
The LGCM with physical abuse as the outcome variable resulted in excellent fit to the 
data 2(17) = 22.068, p > .05; CFI = .972; RMSEA = .042; SRMR = .057. The intercept for 
dehumanization was not significantly associated with changes in physical abuse (β =-.02, 
p>.05), however, the slope for dehumanization was significantly positively associated with 
change in physical abuse (β =.17, p < .05). Specifically, a cubic change in dehumanization 
was associated with increases in physical abuse. 
Discussion 
Dehumanization has been proposed as an impelling factor in the prediction of 
aggression, violence and abuse (Bandura 1999; Bandura et al., 1996; Haslam, 2015; Kelman, 
1976; Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1989). Recently, it has been suggested that this association 
extends beyond the contexts of moral atrocities and intergroup relations, and that 
dehumanization may well yield maltreatment within romantic relationships (Bastian et al., 
2014; Pizzirani et al., 2018). Despite this, there exists no research (intergroup or 
interpersonal) that tests for the implied causal association between dehumanization and 
abuse. To address this limitation, the current study sought to determine the longitudinal 
association between the perpetration of dehumanization and the perpetration of emotional and 
physical abuse within romantic relationships.  
As part of our preliminary analyses, we determined that the trajectory that best fit the 
sample data was a cubic trajectory in which individuals demonstrate both minor decreases 
and points of upward acceleration in dehumanization over time. This trajectory is important 
to highlight as it speaks to the labile nature of dehumanization and affirms the theoretical 
assumption that the phenomenon may be best characterized as malleable over time and likely 
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to be moderately stable at best (for studies that demonstrate changes in dehumanization, see 
Buckels & Trapnell, 2013; Fasoli, et al., 2015; Gwinn et al., 2013).  
The implementation of this non-linear trajectory within our main analyses yielded 
findings to suggest that the perpetration of dehumanization is indeed associated with the 
perpetration of both emotional and physical abuse. These findings are also consistent with 
recent cross-sectional research into which interpersonal dehumanization was reported to be 
associated with not only a wide range of romantic partner maltreatments (e.g., hostility, 
insensitivity, interference and ridicule), but also emotional and physical abuse within 
romantic relationships (Pizzirani et al., 2018). In the present study, however, non-linear 
changes in dehumanization over a six-week period were associated with an increase in abuse 
spanning two months.  
In unpacking our findings further, we found that initial levels of dehumanization (i.e., 
the intercept) was positively associated with abuse, however, this relationship was only found 
for emotional abuse. It was also found that a cubic non-linear change in dehumanization 
perpetration (defined by a pattern of minor decreases and points of upward acceleration) was 
positively associated with increases in both outcome variables (i.e., emotional and physical 
abuse). More specifically, the trajectory of weekly reports of dehumanization across a six-
week period—best represented by a combination of decreases and acute upsurges—
significantly predicted the difference (i.e., LCS) between reports of emotional and physical 
abuse at T1 and two months later, at T8. In particular, it is the upward acceleration (i.e., 
increases) in dehumanization across time points that is associated with increases in emotional 
and physical abuse over time. Put simply, the increase (rather than the attenuation) of 
dehumanization over time is predictive of increases (i.e., changes) in intimate partner abuse. 
Our longitudinal findings are significant for two reasons. Firstly, our findings provide 
the first evidence to suggest that dehumanization appears to be a causal factor in the 
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manifestation of intimate partner abuse. The majority of research into the perpetration of 
abuse is cross-sectional in nature with little by way of empirical data based on prospective 
designs that speaks to changes in the perpetration of abuse over time. Nevertheless, theory 
into intimate partner abuse assumes that various individual differences are indeed impelling 
factors that increase the likelihood of maltreatment manifesting (Finkel & Hall, 2018; Finkel 
et al., 2012). Our findings therefore provide important evidence to support the theoretical 
claims regarding the causal implications of impelling factors.  
Secondly, our findings directly affirm theory and past empirical evidence that 
dehumanization is a factor that facilitates the maltreatment of others (e.g., Allport, 1954, 
1979; Haslam, 2015; Haslam & Loughnan, 2014; Kelman, 1976). Importantly, our work 
extends on past research by suggesting that the maltreatment of others by way of 
dehumanization is not confined to intergroup contexts, acts of atrocity, or even interpersonal 
acquaintances that may have very little emotional connection to the perpetrator (e.g., Bastian 
& Haslam, 2010, 2011; Bastian et al., 2012). Rather, dehumanization can be perpetrated 
against those whom we regard as our most intimate and closest of ties, and that treating 
another as less than human appears to give one license to engage in abuse. As noted by 
Haslam and colleagues (Haslam et al., 2013; Haslam, 2015), dehumanization is thought to 
enable the perpetrator to act abusively or immorally against any individual (including a 
romantic partner) because they perceive the target of dehumanization to be someone who is 
less than human, and thus not worthy of moral and respectful treatment. Specifically, 
dehumanization enables a perpetrator to disconnect—or divorce themselves—from their 
moral reasoning that would usually maintain the humane treatment of others (Bandura, 1999; 
Bandura et al., 1996). Thus, the conceptualization of dehumanization as a mechanism that 
facilitates aggressive or abuse actions in the intergroup literature may well be an appropriate 
way to frame the occurrence of interpersonal dehumanization within romantic relationships.  
Chapter 4 – Dehumanization and Abuse 118 
Limitations and Future Directions 
The current study has some limitations. Firstly, due the complexity of the analyses 
conducted, our sample size was only large enough to assess dehumanization globally (i.e., 
overall). We are therefore unable to shed any light on how the various facets of interpersonal 
dehumanization (see Haslam, 2006; Pizzirani et al., 2018) may differentially predict or be 
related to, emotional and physical abuse within romantic relationships. A more thorough and 
complete examination of interpersonal dehumanization would unpack the dimensional 
elements (e.g., human uniqueness and human nature) of the construct in an attempt to better 
understand how they are associated with intimate partner abuse. Secondly—and as is often 
the case with the study of relationship processes and interactions—the examination between 
dehumanization and abuse within romantic relationships would benefit from a dyadic 
perspective (in order to account for the influence that both members of a couple have on their 
own and their partner’s experience of both dehumanization and abuse).  
And finally, while self-report data is most commonly used when measuring 
dehumanization perpetration (for a review on the measurement advantages of using self-
reports to assess overt dehumanization, see Kteily & Bruneau, 2017), researchers should look 
to confirm our findings by supplementing self-report measurements of dehumanization with 
behavioral (i.e., observational) assessments. By observationally coding for dehumanization—
by way of identifying markers of denying another person unique or essential human qualities 
during relationship tasks that are commonly used in relationship research (e.g., a couple 
conflict discussion)—researchers will be able to triangulate self-report assessments with 
behavior directly observed within couple interactions.  
Conclusion 
The current study builds and expands upon previous studies of dehumanization by not 
only providing the first longitudinal assessment of the phenomenon, but by leveraging this 
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unique longitudinal data to examine dehumanization’s association with emotional and 
physical abuse occurring in romantic relationships. This research involved a novel and 
innovative approach to understanding the factors that lead to abuse at the hands of one’s 
romantic partner and how this may in fact be a result of their tendency to treat their partner as 
less than human. We hope that the findings from this study will help to generate further 
interest in the application of dehumanization to the study of interpersonal relationships and in 
doing so strengthen the evidence-base from which preventative strategies for domestic 
violence and abuse are developed.  
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Figure 1. Latent growth curve model showing the trajectory of dehumanization predicting 
changes in the perpetration of abuse.  
  
Chapter 4 – Dehumanization and Abuse 121 
References 
Adams, S. (2014). Feeling less than human: Exploring the causes and consequences of 
dehumanization from the target’s perspective (Doctoral dissertation). ProQuest 
Dissertations and Theses Global database. 
Allport. G. W. (1979). The nature of prejudice, 3rd edition. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley 
publishing company. (Original work published 1954) 
Andrighetto, L., Baldissarri, C., & Volpato, C. (2016). (Still) modern times: Objectification 
at work. European Journal of Social Psychology, 0, 00 – 00. 
Bain, P., Vaes, G., & Leyens, J-P. (2014). Humanness and Dehumanization. Psychology 
Press: New York, NY. 
Bain, P., Park, J., Kwok, C., & Haslam, N. (2009). Attributing human uniqueness and 
human nature to cultural groups: Distinct forms for subtle dehumanization. Group 
Processes and Intergroup Relations, 12, 789—805. 
Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, 3, 193—209. 
Bandura, A., Barbaranelli, C., Caprara, G., & Pastorelli, C. (1996). Mechanisms of moral 
disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 71, 364—74. 
Bastian, B. (2018). A relational dehumanization perspective on the ‘Dark Triad’. Journal of 
Social and Personal Relationships, in press.  
Bastian, B., & Haslam, N. (2010). Excluded from humanity: The dehumanizing effects of 
social ostracism. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(1), 107—113. 
Bastian, B., & Haslam, N. (2011). Experiencing dehumanization: Cognitive and emotional 
effects of everyday dehumanization. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 33(4), 
295—303. 
Chapter 4 – Dehumanization and Abuse 122 
Bastian, B., Jetten, J., & Haslam, N. (2014). An interpersonal perspective on 
dehumanization. In P. Bain, G. Vaes, & J-P. Leyens, (Eds.), Humanness and 
dehumanization (pp 205—224). Psychology Press: New York, NY. 
Bastian, B., Jetten, J., & Radke, H. R. M. (2012). Cyber-dehumanization: Violent video 
game play diminishes our humanity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, 
486—491. 
Buckels, E. E., & Trapnell, P. D. (2013). Disgust facilitates outgroup dehumanization. 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 16(6), 771—780. 
Canevello, A., & Crocker, J. (2010). Creating good relationships: Responsiveness, 
relationship quality, and interpersonal goals. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 99(1), 78. 
Chen, F. F. (2007). Sensitivity of goodness of fit indexes to lack of measurement 
invariance. Structural equation modeling, 14(3), 464-504. 
Cheung, G. W., & Rensvold, R. B. (2002). Evaluating Goodness-of-Fit Indexes for Testing 
Measurement Invariance. Structural Equation Modeling, 9, 233-255. 
Fasoli, F., Paladino, M. P., Carnaghi, A., Jetten, J., Bastian, B., & Bain, P, G. (2016). Not 
“just words”: Exposure to homophobic epithets leads to dehumanizing and physical 
distancing from gay men. European Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 237—248. 
Fletcher, G. J. O., Simpson, J. A., & Thomas, G. (2000). The measurement of perceived 
relationship quality components: A confirmatory factor analytic approach. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(3), 340—354. 
Follingstad, D. R., Rutledge, L. L., Berg, B. J., Hause, E. S., & Polek, D. S. (1990). The 
role of emotional abuse in physically abusive relationships. Journal of family 
violence, 5(2), 107-120. 
Gottman, J. M., Murray, J. D., Swanson, C. C., Tyson, R., & Swanson, K. R. (2002). The 
Chapter 4 – Dehumanization and Abuse 123 
mathematics of marriage: Dynamic nonlinear approach. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.   
Gonzaga, G. C., Campos, B., Bradbury, T. (2007). Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 93(1), 34—48. 
Gwinn, J. D., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (2013). Less power = less human? Effects of power 
differentials on dehumanization. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49, 
464—470. 
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 10(3), 252—264.  
Haslam, N. (2015). Dehumanization and intergroup relations. In M. Milkulincer and P.R. 
Shaver (Eds.), Handbook of Personality and Social Psychology: Vol 2, Group 
Processes (pp. 295—314). Washington D.C. : American Psychological Association. 
Haslam, N., Bain, P., Douge, L., Lee, M., & Bastian, B. (2005). More human than you: 
Attributing humanness to self and others. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 89, 937—950. 
Haslam, N., & Loughnan, S. (2014). Dehumanization and infrahumanization. Annual Review 
of Psychology, 65, 399—423. 
Haslam, N., Loughnan, S., & Holland, E. (2013). The psychology of humanness. In S. J. 
Gervais (Eds.), Objectification and (de)humanization: 60th Nebraska symposium on 
motivation (pp 25—51). New York, NY: Springer Science and Business Media. 
Haslam, N., & Stratemeyer, M. (2016). Recent research on dehumanization. Current 
Opinion in Psychology, 11, 25—29. 
Higgins, D. J., & McCabe, P., M. (2000). Multi-type maltreatment and the long-term 
adjustment of adults. Child abuse review 9(1), 6—18. 
Holley, S. R. (2011). The demand-withdraw communication pattern in middle-aged and 
Chapter 4 – Dehumanization and Abuse 124 
older couples: A longitudinal study (Doctoral dissertation). ProQuest Dissertations 
and Theses Global database. 
Kelman, H. (1976). Violence without restraint: Reflections on the dehumanization of 
victims and victimizers. In G. Kren & L. Rappoport (Eds.), Varieties of 
Psychohistory (pp. 282—314). New York: Springer. 
Kteily, N. S., & Bruneau, E. (2017). Darker demons of our nature: The need to (re)focus 
attention on Blatant forms of dehumanization. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 26(6), 487—494. 
Kteily, N. S., Bruneau, E., Waytz, A., & Cotterill, S. (2015). The ascent of man: Theoretical 
and Empirical evidence for blatant dehumanization. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 109(5), 901—931. 
Leyens, J-P., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Vaes, J., Demoulin, S., Rodriguez-Perez, A., & Gaunt, R. 
(2000). The emotional side of prejudice: The attribution of secondary emotions to 
ingroups and outgroups. Personality & Social Psychology Review, 4, 186—197. 
Linden, M., Bjorklund, F., & Backstrom, M. (2016). What makes authoritarian and socially 
dominant people more positive to using torture in the war on terrorism? Personality 
and Individual difference, 91, 98—101. 
Noller, P., Feeney, J., Bonnell, D., & Callan, V. (1994). Journal of Social and Personal 
Relationships, 11(2), 233—252. 
Overall, N. C., Fletcher, G. J., & Simpson, J. A. (2010). Helping each other grow: Romantic 
partner support, self-improvement, and relationship quality. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 36(11), 1496-1513. 
Opotow, S. (1990). Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction. Journal of Social Issues 
and Policy Review, 46, 1 – 20. 
Pizzirani, B., & Karantzas, C. G. (2018). The experience of hurt: A dehumanization 
Chapter 4 – Dehumanization and Abuse 125 
perspective. Under review (Chapter 2 of this dissertation). 
Pizzirani, B., Karantzas, C. G., & Mullins, E. (2018). The Development and Validation of a 
Dehumanization Measure Within Romantic Relationships. Under review (Chapter 3 
of this dissertation). 
Rubin, H., & Campbell, L. (2012). Day-to-day changes in intimacy predict heightened 
relationship passion, sexual occurrence, and sexual satisfaction: A dyadic diary 
analysis. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 3(2), 224-231. 
Staub, E. (1989). The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence. 
New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Vaes, J., Paladino, M. P., & Leyens, J-P. (2002). The lost e-mail: Prosocial reactions 
induced by uniquely human emotions. British Journal of Social Psychology, 41(4), 
521—523. 
Vaes, J., Paladino, M. P., Puvia, E. (2011). Are sexualized women complete human beings? 
Why men and women dehumanize sexually objectified women. European Journal of 
Social Psychology, 41, 774—785.  
 
 
  
Chapter 4 – Dehumanization and Abuse 126 
Chapter 4 Conclusion 
Paper 3, which is reported in this chapter, has a number of significant implications for 
the study of dehumanization within close and intimate relationships. Firstly, the findings 
build directly on the previous papers presented in Chapters 2 and 3 in which dehumanization 
was proposed to be associated with the maltreatment of others (Paper 1, Chapter 2) and 
empirical evidence (cross-sectional) was provided for this proposed association (Paper 2, 
Chapter 3). 
Specifically, Paper 3 goes beyond the theoretical reasoning and cross-sectional 
findings reported in Papers 1 and 2 (and past research) by providing longitudinal evidence for 
the association between dehumanization and intimate partner abuse. In doing so, these 
findings confirm the long-held view in the intergroup literature that dehumanization is an 
impelling factor that causes an individual to engage in the maltreatment of others in the form 
of aggression, violence, or abuse (Bandura 1999; Bandura et al., 1996; Haslam, 2015; 
Kelman, 1976; Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1989). The findings of Paper 3 highlight the importance 
of framing dehumanization as a possible factor in the manifestation of family and domestic 
violence. In particular, the findings suggest that understanding the role that dehumanization 
can play in intimate partner abuse may be important in helping to end cycles of violence 
within close relationships (Bastian, et al., 2014). 
Secondly, this chapter highlights that interpersonal dehumanization may be best 
characterized as a moderately stable facet of individual differences. As noted in Papers 1 and 
2 (Chapters 2 & 3), many relational phenomena and individual differences tied to relationship 
processes demonstrate dynamic properties (e.g., Gillath et al., 2016; Overall et al., 2010; 
Rubin & Campbell, 2012). The findings of Paper 3 suggest that dehumanization is a dynamic 
phenomenon that can be conceptualized over time as having a non-linear trajectory. This 
trajectory is characterized by reductions as well as acute increases in the tendency to 
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perpetrate dehumanization over time. This non-linear pattern may point to role that particular 
contextual factors play in increasing or attenuating people’s tendencies to engage in 
dehumanization. Thus, future research should investigate the types of moderating variables 
that may help to explain the non-linear pattern of dehumanization identified in Paper 3. 
Importantly, researching the contextual moderators (e.g., circumstances, discussions, or 
interactions considered to be highly serious, frustrating, or distressing) that are likely 
associated with dehumanization may be important in identifying factors that increase as well 
as buffer the risk of dehumanization in intimate relationships. This, in turn, may have 
important and novel flow-on effects in terms integrating a dehumanization framework into 
couple and family violence interventions.  
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CHAPTER 5: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Traditionally, dehumanization was conceptualized as an extreme phenomenon 
typically examined in the context of mass violence (i.e., the Boko Haram violence in 
Nigeria), intense conflict (i.e., the Gaza-Israel conflict, Kelman, 1976; Staub, 1989) and 
moral atrocities (i.e., the Jewish Holocaust, and the genocide against the Tutsi in Rawanda, 
Bandura, 1999; Opotow, 1990). Since this early work, the conceptualization of 
dehumanization has evolved to acknowledge that the phenomenon is not limited to conditions 
bound by prejudice or inter-group conflict (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2010, 2011; Haslam, 
2006; Leyens et al., 2001). Instead, dehumanization can also be conceptualized as a relatively 
common phenomenon that occurs in everyday social interactions. Despite the emergence of 
research into interpersonal dehumanization, however, no research has investigated 
dehumanization within the context of intimate close relationships (such as people’s romantic 
relationships). Thus, our understanding to date regarding dehumanization is largely confined 
to the intergroup literature and social psychology more generally. 
The major aim of this dissertation was to investigate dehumanization within the 
context of close and intimate relationships. In addressing this primary aim, this dissertation 
makes a significant contribution to both the fields of dehumanization and close relationships 
in that it is the first attempt to theoretically and empirically couch the study of close and 
intimate relationships within a dehumanization framework. This final chapter begins with a 
brief overview of the research conducted in this dissertation, followed by a discussion of the 
broader implications of the findings for the understanding and study of both dehumanization 
and close relationships.  
Summary of results 
In Chapter 2, Paper 1 was presented in which a theoretical model was proposed 
suggesting that dehumanization may be the underlying cause of hurt feelings that occur in 
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interpersonal interactions. Importantly, the proposed model reflects an integrative framework 
that unifies previously espoused explanations of hurt (e.g., Feeney, 2004; Leary, Springer, 
Negel, Ansell & Evans, 1998; Vangelisti, Young, Carpenter-Theune, & Alexander, 2005). In 
doing so, this model reconciles points of difference across previous theories and typologies. 
Furthermore, the model reflects the first theoretical attempt to integrate dehumanization 
within the study of close and intimate relationships. In doing so, the model also outlines the 
types of negative relationship behaviors that are characteristic of dehumanization, and thus, 
reflective of partner maltreatment. The implications and future directions outlined as part of 
Paper 1 provided the grounding for the papers reported across Chapters 3 and 4. These 
implications and future directions included the need to provide empirical evidence for the 
theorized associations between dehumanization and relationship behaviors indicative of 
abuse and maltreatment such as undermining and interfering social support, hostility 
[aggression], and conditional regard, to name but a few.  
 Although Paper 1 served as the conceptual foundation for this dissertation, Paper 2 
provided the first empirical investigation of dehumanization within intimate relationships. 
Specifically, Paper 2 (see Chapter 3) described the development and validation of the 
Dehumanization in Romantic Relationships Scale (DIRRS)—and in doing so revealed a 
novel factor structure that decomposes the denial of human uniqueness and human nature into 
two factors respectively—immaturity/competence and social refinement (denials of human 
uniqueness), and conditional regard and dissociation (denials of human nature). Thus, Paper 2 
advances the conceptualization of interpersonal dehumanization, by extending on past 
unidimensional and two-dimensional conceptualizations. To date, there exists some debate as 
to whether dehumanization is best represented as a unitary or multifaceted construct. The 
findings from Paper 2 speak to the multi-dimensional nature of the construct, but also 
highlight that the multiple facets that constitute the DIRRS (and thus interpersonal 
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dehumanization), may reflect lowered-order facets that may be aggregated up to form 
unidimensional or two-dimensional (i.e., denial of human uniqueness and denial of human 
nature) higher-order assessments of dehumanization. Importantly, across lower and higher-
order levels of assessment, the conceptual structure of interpersonal dehumanization seems 
consistent irrespective of whether the target or perpetrator perspectives are measured. 
Paper 2 also provided the first empirical evidence that dehumanization not only 
occurs in intimate relationships, but that it is associated with a wide range of relationship 
processes and outcomes (many of which were outlined in Paper 1 [Chapter 2]). For example, 
all four facets of the DIRRS were positively associated with destructive communication 
patterns, negative partner behaviors such as hostility, insensitivity, interference (including 
care that was intrusive), and ridicule. In contrast the facets were negatively associated with 
constructive communication patterns, the provision of sensitive-proximal care, relationship 
quality, regard for one’s partner and positive self-appraisals. Thus, dehumanization within 
romantic relationships attenuates positive relationship appraisals and functioning but 
amplifies negative appraisals of oneself and partner as well as exacerbating negative 
relationship processes. Furthermore, while not reported as part of this dissertation, work in 
preparation has also provided proof-of-concept regarding the central proposition of the model 
of dehumanization outlined in Paper 1. Specifically, dehumanization is also positively 
associated with experiences of hurt (r = .21 to .61) across studies with both individuals and 
dyads (Pizzirani & Karantzas, 2018). 
 Finally, Paper 2 reported that the facets constituting interpersonal dehumanization 
were associated with emotional and physical partner abuse. These findings pertaining to 
abuse highlight that dehumanization is indeed associated with relationship behaviors that 
extend into the realm of intimate partner maltreatment. While these finding were preliminary 
in nature, they were important to this dissertation for two reasons. Firstly, no other study has 
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reported empirical evidence for the association between dehumanization and intimate partner 
abuse (while Paper 1 described how particular interpersonal experiences [some of which are 
considered to be maltreatment] constitute the denial of humanness, this work was theoretical 
in nature). Secondly, the findings from Paper 2 were the catalyst for a more specific 
investigation of the association between perpetration of dehumanization and abuse reported 
as part of Paper 3.  
Paper 3 (Chapter 4) addressed an important gap in the literature on dehumanization by 
testing the underlying causal assumption between dehumanization and the maltreatment or 
abuse of other. While Paper 3 tests this assumption within the context of romantic 
relationships, the findings have significant implications for the dehumanization field more 
broadly. That is, the findings affirm not only the association between dehumanization and 
intimate partner abuse but also the long-held view (within the intergroup perspective) that 
dehumanization functions as an impelling factor in the manifestation of violent, aggressive 
and abusive acts. This assumption regarding dehumanization, first proposed over five 
decades ago (e.g., Allport, 1954/1979; Kelman, 1976) has echoed throughout the study of 
dehumanization but—until now—had not been investigated longitudinally. Thus, Paper 3 
offers the first empirical evidence that presents dehumanization as a causal factor in the 
maltreatment of others.  
In addition, Paper 3 also revealed another significant and novel finding relevant to the 
phenomenon of dehumanization. In particular, Paper 3 demonstrated how the longitudinal 
trajectory of dehumanization reflects an aspect of individual difference that is moderately 
stable and exhibits non-linear change over time.  While previous work has demonstrated 
experimentally that dehumanization can change as a function of the manipulation of an 
independent variable (including disgust, power and exposure to homophobic epithets; e.g., 
Buckels & Trapnell, 2013; Fasoli, et al., 2015; Gwinn, Judd, & Park, 2013), no study had 
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examined naturally occurring fluctuations in dehumanization over time. These findings, 
therefore, broaden the scope of dehumanization by considering it as a construct that may well 
be malleable as a function of time and situation. To this end, identifying the factors that 
moderate the trajectory of dehumanization is likely to yield important insights into the nature 
of the phenomenon.  
Implications for Future Research  
 The three papers constituting this dissertation significantly contribute to the fields of 
dehumanization and close relationships by highlighting the ways in which denials of 
humanness are associated with a wide range of relationships outcomes and processes. 
Importantly, the theory and empirical evidence reflected across the three papers suggest that 
dehumanization may be an important factor in not only the experience of hurt feelings, but 
the manifestation of intimate partner abuse.  
As underscored in the title of this dissertation (‘From the Intergroup to the 
Interpersonal: Dehumanization Within Close and Intimate Relationships’), a major strength 
of this body of work is that it represents the benefits and utility of theoretical integration. Too 
often scholars work within silos in their respective fields, often overlooking theory and ideas 
conceptualized outside of the literature from which they publish and consume most often. 
This can lead to different areas of research often ‘reinventing the wheel’ or using a variety of 
terms and labels when discussing the same or overlapping constructs. This dissertation, 
however, applied a largely intergroup phenomenon (historically investigated in contexts of 
extreme violence and atrocity) to the study of close relationship processes and outcomes.  
In addition, this dissertation encompasses a number of original and innovating 
findings. For example, in Chapter 2, the Paper 1 outlined a dehumanization model of hurt. 
Specifically, dehumanization was described as the underlying cause of hurt feelings. 
Chapter 5—General Discussion   133 
Importantly, this model provides a (much needed) parsimonious account of hurt and 
identifies a number of relationship behaviors as the denial of humanness.  
In Chapter 3, Paper 2 was presented, which reports on the development and validation 
of the DIRRS. The DIRRS provides a measurement of interpersonal dehumanization capable 
of not only capturing both perpetrator and target perspectives, but that can also be used to 
assess dehumanization at the facet level as well as at a higher-order level. The level of 
specificity regarding assessment (i.e., facet or higher order), is largely dependent on the level 
at which the researcher wishes to measure the construct. It is important to note, however, that 
our facet-level findings reflect a novel conceptualization of dehumanization that may be 
especially important to maintain when investigating associations with diverse relationship 
processes and outcomes.  
Chapter 4 presents Paper 3, which details the first empirical evidence demonstrating 
dehumanization to be a casual factor in the manifestation of abuse. Furthermore, the findings 
highlight that the perpetration of dehumanization appears to be malleable over time. The 
results of Paper 3 provide empirical validation for the various theoretical propositions 
regarding dehumanization as an impelling factor in the maltreatment of others. This, coupled 
with the moderate stability of dehumanization over time can inform applied research and 
interventions into ways to attenuate the dehumanization tendencies of individuals—especially 
those who are in couples experiencing high levels of abuse and conflict. The findings 
highlight that it may be important to assess dehumanization with contexts of domestic 
violence and maltreatment and that such assessments are likely to inform researchers and 
practitioners as to individuals who are most at risk of committing intimate partner violence. 
Moreover, the moderate stability of dehumanization may also inform points of intervention at 
which strategies to short-circuit one’s tendency to dehumanize may be most effective.  
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These findings, however, should be viewed in light of research study limitations 
outlined in each paper presented across Chapters 2 to 4, as well as the future directions noted. 
In particular, there is a clear need for both dyadic and observational data when investigating 
dehumanization within the context of close and intimate relationships. For example, within 
an interpersonal context (such as romantic relationships), dehumanization should be 
considered dyadic in nature. In this way a person’s experiences of dehumanization will entail 
either treating one’s partner as less than human (i.e., perpetration) and/or being the target of 
dehumanization enacted by one’s partner. Importantly, future research that employs dyadic 
designs will allow researchers to account for the influence that both members of a couple 
have on their own and their partner’s experience of being the perpetrator and target of 
dehumanization. Furthermore, future research should attempt to build on the self-report 
approach to data collection reported in the papers across Chapters 3 and 4. By observationally 
coding for dehumanization (by way of identifying markers of denying humanness to another) 
researchers will be able to determine the concordance between self-report and behavioral 
assessments as well as develop a more comprehensive conceptualization of dehumanization 
and its manifestation within close or intimate relationships.  
Conclusion 
This dissertation makes a significant and novel contribution in understanding how 
dehumanization may manifest within the context of close and intimate relationships.  
The findings have significant implications for two very disparate—but clearly complimentary 
literatures (i.e., dehumanization [intergroup and social psychology literature more generally] 
and close relationships [interpersonal literature]). That this, through the theoretical 
integration of dehumanization into the study of close and intimate relationships this 
dissertation has provided both areas of research with new and useful ways of theorizing, 
conceptualizing, and assessing interpersonal dehumanization. Ultimately, it is hoped that the 
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papers included as part of this dissertation will be useful in developing fresh insights into the 
study of dehumanization and close and intimate relationships, as well as continued 
integration across these two distinct but compatible fields of research into human behavior.  
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